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Abstract
Recently, an unconditional exponential separation between the hazard-free complexity and
(standard) circuit complexity of explicit functions has been shown [IKL+18]. This raises the
question: which classes of functions permit efficient hazard-free circuits?
Our main result is as follows. A transducer is a finite state machine that transcribes, symbol
by symbol, an input string of length n into an output string of length n. We prove that any
function arising from a transducer with s states receiving input symbols encoded by ℓ bits has
a hazard-free circuit of size 2O(s+ℓ) · n and depth O(ℓ + s · logn); in particular, if s, ℓ ∈ O(1),
size and depth are asymptotically optimal.
We utilize our main result to derive efficient circuits for k-recoverable addition. Informally
speaking, a code is k-recoverable if it does not increase uncertainty regarding the encoded value,
so long as it is guaranteed that it is from {x, x+ 1, . . . , x+ k} for some x ∈ N0. We provide an
asymptotically optimal k-recoverable code. We also realize a transducer with O(k) states that
adds two codewords from this k-recoverable code. Combined with our main result, we obtain a
hazard-free adder circuit of size 2O(k)n and depth O(k logn) with respect to this code, i.e., a k-
recoverable adder circuit that adds two codewords of n bits each. In other words, k-recoverable
addition is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to k. We then reduce the maximum size of
the state machines involved to O(1), resulting in a circuit for k-recoverable addition of size
O(n + k log k) and depth O(log n). Thus, if the uncertainties of each of the addends span
intervals of length O(n/ logn), there is an asymptotically optimal adder that attains the best
possible output uncertainty.
∗Author email addresses: jbund@mpi-inf.mpg.de, clenzen@mpi-inf.mpg.de, medinamo@bgu.ac.il
1 Introduction
In this work, we study a classic extension of Boolean logic due to Kleene [Kle52, §64] that allows
for the presence of unstable (i.e., transitioning, oscillating, unspecified, etc.) signals, which are
represented by a third logical value u. Referring to the Boolean values B := {0, 1} as stable, in
Kleene logic the basic gates1 output a stable value if and only if the stable inputs already determine
this output:
or 0 1 u
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 u
u 0 u u
and 0 1 u
0 0 1 u
1 1 1 1
u u 1 u
not
0 1
1 0
u u
By induction over the circuit structure, this defines for any circuit C consisting of such gates the
function C : Tn → Tm it implements, where T := {0, 1, u}. A main feature differentiating Kleene
logic from Boolean logic is that the law of the excluded middle does not hold: or(x, x¯) 6= 1 and
and(x, x¯) 6= 0. This critically distinguishes u from an unknown Boolean value, and it explains why
we allow for constant-0 (and constant-1) gates in addition to or, and, and not.
A circuit has a hazard, if, unlike basic gates, it deviates from the best possible behavior in face
of unstable inputs.
Definition 1.1 (Resolution and Hazards). For x ∈ Tn, its resolutions are
res(x) := {y ∈ Bn | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xi 6= u⇒ yi = xi} ,
i.e., the set of binary strings that can be obtained from x by replacing each u by either 0 or 1.
A circuit C on n inputs with m outputs has a hazard at input x ∈ Tn (and output bit i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}), iff Ci(x) = u, yet there is a bit b ∈ B such that Ci(y) = b for all y ∈ res(x). It is a
k-bit hazard, iff the number of us in x is at most k ∈ N.
In contrast, a circuit is (k-bit) hazard-free2 iff it has no (k-bit) hazards. An already mentioned
trivial example for a circuit with a hazard is and(x, x¯), as it implements the constant Boolean
function f(x) = 0, but and(u, u¯) = u; a hazard-free implementation would use a constant-0 gate,
ignoring the input to the circuit. The smallest non-trivial example is a multiplexer, which has the
Boolean specification MUX(a, b, 0) = a and MUX(a, b, 1) = b, see, e.g., [IKL+18].
The importance of this fundamental concept is illustrated by its surfacing in areas as diverse
as digital circuit design [Huf57, Cal58, FFL18], logic [Kle52, Ko¨r66], and cybersecurity [TWM+09,
HOI+12]. Accordingly, the design of hazard-free circuits has received significant attention over the
years, cf. Section 2. Early on, Huffman established that all Boolean functions admit a hazard-free
circuit implementing them [Huf57]. However, recently unconditional exponential lower bounds for
explicit functions have been shown [IKL+18], including functions that admit hazardous circuits of
polynomial size.
This naturally raises the question for which classes of functions small hazard-free circuits exist.
But which classes are of particular interest? In [FFL18], it is proposed to use hazard-free circuits
in the design of digital controllers for “analog” (i.e., continuously-valued) actuating variables. A
topological argument [Mar81] proves that in this setting metastability (i.e., instability of circuit
outputs that may last arbitrarily long) cannot be avoided deterministically. Hazard-free circuits
open up the possibility to avoid the delay incurred by waiting for metastability to decay with
1The specific choice of basic gates does not matter, see [IKL+18]; accordingly, we stick with and, or, and not here.
2The term hazard-free has varying meanings in the literature; we follow the definition from [DDT78].
2
sufficiently high probability, enabling the control loop to counteract accumulating errors quicker;
ultimately, this results in better performance, despite going from a probabilistic to a deterministic
correctness guarantee.
A major open question posed in [FFL18] is whether efficient circuits implementing the proposed
approach exist. As a promising example, a positive answer has been provided for sorting [BLM18].
However, arguably more arithmetic operations are required to make the concept practical: we
need hazard-free circuits for addition, multiplication, division, etc; in fact, besides sorting, division
by 2 and addition are the operations missing to fully implement the computations of the clock
synchronization module proposed in [FFL18] by a digital circuit.
In a seminal article, Ladner and Fischer [LF80] showed that any function that can be realized by
a constant-size finite-state transducer can be implemented by a circuit of linear size and logarithmic
depth. Addition and, by extension, multiplication and division by constants, fall into this class
of functions. Interestingly, the sorting circuit presented in [BLM18] relies on a special case of
this framework, suggesting the possibility of a generalization to hazard-free circuits. Given these
considerations and the central role addition plays in arithmetics, this work sets out to study hazard-
free circuits for the class of functions arising from such transducers.
Transducers
A transducer is a finite state machine transcribing an input to an output string. We phrase our
results for Moore machines [Moo56], but our techniques are not specific to this type of transducer.
Definition 1.2 (Moore Machine). A Moore machine is a 6-tuple T = (S, s0,Σ,Λ, t, o), where
• S is the finite set of states,
• s0 ∈ S is the starting state,
• Σ is the input alphabet,
• Λ is the output alphabet,
• t : S × Σ→ S is the state transition function, and
• o : S × Σ→ Λ is the output function.
For n ∈ N, Moore machine T gives rise to the transcription function τT,n : Σ
n → Λn in the following
way. Define for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and x ∈ Σn the state si after i steps inductively via si := t(si−1, xi).
Then τT,n(x)i := o(si−1, xi). In the following, we will omit T and n from the notation whenever
clear from context, i.e., we simply write τ instead of τT,n.
Unless we impose restrictions, any function f : Bn → B can (essentially) be realized by a tran-
scription function. For instance, even when restricting to Σ = Λ = B, the state machine can simply
memorize the entire input string x and output f(x) on reception of the last input bit However, this
requires |S| to be exponential in n, i.e., the state machine is very large.
Accordingly, it is of interest to consider small transducers. In particular, essential basic oper-
ations, like addition, max, and min, can be implemented by constant-size transducers. However,
there is more to the task than providing hazard-free circuits for such operations.
Encoding Matters!
In the Boolean world, the choice of encoding may influence the complexity of an operation, but not
its precision. In face of hazards, however, the encoding may cause unnecessary loss of information.
To illustrate this point, we describe the desired behavior first. Suppose that we are given two
k-preserving inputs in n-bit unary encoding, which means that input x ∈ Tn satisfies that res(x)
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contains at most k+1 codewords, all of which are consecutive. Such inputs are of the form 1∗u∗0∗,
where the number of u’s is at most k and the length of the string is n. The following definition is
helpful in expressing how such inputs are constructed.
Definition 1.3 (The ∗-operator). For x, y ∈ T, x ∗ y = x if x = y and x ∗ y = u otherwise. We
extend this associative and commutative operator to strings x, y ∈ Tn by applying it bit-wise.
Denoting by γu the unary encoding function, we get that inputs are of the form ∗jℓ=i γu(ℓ) =
∗jℓ=i 1
ℓ0n−ℓ = 1iuj−i0n−j , where i, j ∈ [n + 1] and j − i ≤ k. We can obtain a (2n)-bit unary
encoding of their sum that treats the us in the “right” way by sorting the 2n input bits with
respect to the order 0 ≺ u ≺ 1. This is straightforward, as and and or implement max and min
with respect to this order, meaning that they together realize a ≺-comparator. Feeding inputs
1iuj−i0n−j and 1i
′
u
j′−i′0n−j
′
into a sorting network for 2n inputs using such comparators outputs
1i+i
′
u
j+j′−i−i′02n−j−j
′
= ∗j
′+j′
ℓ=i+i′ γu(ℓ).
Note that this addition maintains information to the best possible degree: The codewords that
are resolutions of these strings represent the numbers {i, . . . , j}, {i′, . . . , j′}, and {i+ i′, . . . , j+ j′},
respectively. In other words, the uncertainty in the output regarding which value is represented
matches the uncertainty of the inputs. The reader may think of this as a faithful representation of
interval addition.
The above unary encoding has another crucial property. We can consistently map any resolution
of the output back to a codeword. We extend γ−1u (the decoding function that is defined on
γu([n + 1])) to B
n as follows: For x ∈ Bn, let i ∈ [n + 1] be maximal such that xj = 1 for all
j ∈ [i + 1]. Then γ−1u (x) := i and then γu(γ
−1
u (x)) = 1
i0n−i. Observe that this guarantees that
γ−1u (res(∗
j
ℓ=i γ(ℓ))) = {i, . . . , j}, i.e., after stabilization we can recover a value from the range that
was represented by the string 1iuj−i0n−j using γ−1u . This property is very similar to the ability
of error correction codes to recover the correct codeword in face of bit flips; here, we recover a
“correct” value in the sense that it is consistent with the information that was available. We refer
to this as the code being recoverable. We will see that this is both highly useful and the best we
can expect.
Naturally, the above positive example is of limited interest, as it is extremely inefficient due to
the exponential overhead of unary encoding. So, what happens if we use a non-redundant encoding?
It is not hard to see that standard binary encoding results in disaster. For instance, denoting by
Bn : [2
n] → Bn an n-bit code, we have that B4(7) = 0111 and B4(0) ∗ B4(1) = 000u; for this pair
of strings, it is unclear whether their sum should be 7 or 8. In contrast, B4(7 + 0) ∗ B4(7 + 1) =
0111 ∗ 1000 = uuuu, i.e., the resulting string holds no information whatsoever. This is an extreme
example, in which (even given all other bits) a single input bit affects all output bits, which in
Kleene logic entails that setting this bit to u implies that all outputs are u.3 In other words, the
code provides no non-trivial guarantees in face of uncertainty at its input.
The above examples show that we should aim for codes that behave similarly to unary encoding
in face of unstable inputs, have a high rate,4 and yet permit efficient circuits for arithmetic and
other basic computations.
Our Contribution
Our contribution is twofold. First, on the conceptual level, we propose a meaningful addition in
Kleene logic, providing and motivating the necessary key definitions, and demonstrating that they
are realizable. We formalize the properties of unary encoding discussed above in the next definition.
3This can be seen by induction on the circuit size, where the base case is given by the behavior of the basic gates.
4For encoding function γ : [2m]→ Bℓ, the rate is the ratio m/ℓ ≤ 1.
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Definition 4.1 (k-preserving & recoverable Codes). A code is an injective function γ : [M ]→ Bn
(where [M ] := {0, . . . ,M−1}), whose image is the set of codewords. By γ−1 we denote the decoding
function, i.e., the inverse of γ on its image. For range r = 〈i, i + k〉M , where 〈i, i + k〉M denotes
k+1 consecutive integers modulo M starting at i, define xr := ∗ γ(r) as the corresponding extended
codeword and define its range as rxr := r.
(i) For extended codeword x, px := |rx| − 1 is its imprecision (i.e., codewords are 0-imprecise).
(ii) Let k ∈ N0. Code γ is k-preserving, iff for all p ≤ k and p-imprecise extended codewords x it
holds that γ([M ]) ∩ res(x) = γ(rx). That is, res(x) does not contain “new” codewords which
are not in γ(rx).
(iii) Let k ∈ N0. Code γ is k-recoverable, iff there is an extension of γ
−1 to Bn (i.e., the entire
codomain of γ) such that for all extended codewords x of imprecision px ≤ k and all y ∈ res(x)
it holds that γ−1(y) ∈ rx.
We prove that any k-recoverable code requires at least k redundant bits.
Theorem 4.2. For k, n ∈ N, no code γ : [(k + 1) · 2n−k]→ Bn is p-recoverable for p > k.
We give a simple and natural code that requires k redundant bits in order to be k-preserving.
Informally, the front part of the code is a Reflected Gray Code of n− k bits, and the rear part is a
unary code of k bits.
Lemma 4.13. γn,k is k-preserving.
The same code γ can be made k-recoverable by using 2k − 1 redundant bits. This means that
the obtained code is asymptotically optimal, that is, its rate is 1−O
(
1
n
)
.
Theorem 4.15. γn,k : [(k + 1) · 2
n−k]→ Bn is ⌈k/2⌉-recoverable.
We show that using this code comes at no loss in computational power compared to (inefficient)
unary encoding, so long as the limits of the uncertainty the code can tolerate are not exceeded.
This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let f : [M ]→ Bm. For any k-recoverable code γ : [M ]→ Bn, there is a combinational
circuit C satisfying for all p ≤ k and p-imprecise codewords x that
C(x) = ∗
i∈rx
f(i) .
We also establish that efficient operations can be performed on this code, most prominently
addition. In short, we propose a foundation for arithmetic computations in Kleene logic. We begin
by defining addition in this context.
Definition 5.1 (k-recoverable Addition). For code γ : [M ] → Bn, we define γ-addition in the
natural way: For codewords x, y ∈ γ[M ], x+γ y = γ(γ
−1(x)+γ−1(y) mod M). If γ is k-recoverable
for k ∈ N0, we extend this definition to all x, y ∈ B
n by the (not necessarily unique) extension of
γ−1 to Bn, which k-recoverability guarantees. A circuit implements k-recoverable addition w.r.t.
k-recoverable code γ, iff it implements (the extended) operator +γ on extended codewords x and y
satisfying that px + py ≤ k without hazards.
We also obtain the following hazard free adder.
Theorem 5.11. There is a circuit of size 2O(k)n and depth O(k log n) that implements ⌈k/2⌉-
recoverable addition on γn,k.
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Most of the insights mentioned above can be shown using straightforward arguments; once the
pieces are in place, a general picture emerges naturally. We view our contribution in this regard
primarily in posing the right questions and distilling the appropriate definitions. An exception is a
key ingredient to our machinery for addition, which we consider to be the main technical challenge
and second main contribution of this work.
Theorem 3.13. For any ℓ, n ∈ N and Moore machine T = (S, s0,Σ ⊆ B
ℓ,Λ, t, o), there is a
hazard-free circuit of size O
((
2ℓ+2|S| + 23|S|
)
n
)
and depth O (ℓ+ |S| log n) implementing τT,n.
We remark that this result stands out against the lower bound from [IKL+18], which proves an
exponential dependence of the circuit size on n for any general construction of hazard-free circuits.
While the above theorem incurs exponential overheads in terms of the size of the transducer,
the dependence on n is asymptotically optimal. Thus, for constant size transducers, we obtain
asymptotically optimal hazard-free implementations of their transcription functions, both with
respect to size and depth.
Finally, we reduce the maximum size of the state machines involved in the construction to
O(1), resulting in a circuit for k-recoverable addition of size O(n + k log k) and depth O(log n).
Roughly speaking, we can execute the addition of the unary part by sorting, as described before, and
afterwards use a simple circuit to generate the correctly encoded result. However, the latter step
requires to determine the parity of the reflected Gray code part of the output string, which implies
that it has to be determined first—and computing this part of the output requires knowledge on
the carry bit from the unary addition.
This may look like a “chicken-and-egg” problem, but we show how to break this cyclic depen-
dence. This result is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.20. There is a circuit of size O(n + k log k) and depth O(log n) that implements
⌈k/2⌉-recoverable addition on γn,k.
Organization of this Article
We discuss related work in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we present our generic construction of hazard-free
circuits for transcription functions, i.e., we prove Thm. 3.13. Subsequently, in Sec. 4, we define
k-preserving and k-recoverable codes. We provide a k-recoverable code and prove that its rate is
asymptotically optimal.5 Moreover, we formalize the notion of “an uncertainty of k in an input”
and show that a k-recoverable code allows for implementing any function such that this uncertainty
is preserved; this serves as a strong indicator that requiring k-recoverability (for a suitable k) is
a good choice. This result is flanked by some additional observations further supporting the view
that the proposed concepts may serve as a solid basis for arithmetic computations in Kleene logic.
Next, Sec. 5 utilizes the tools developed in Sec. 3 and 4 to construct asymptotically optimal circuits
for k-recoverable addition.
2 Related Work
There are a variety of 3-valued logics in use, but relevant to this work is only Kleene’s “strong logic
of indeterminacy” [Kle52, §64] which he has published as early as 1938 [Kle38]. Over time, it has
been utilized in a large number of contexts.
5The rate is actually 1−O
(
1
n
)
.
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Metastability in Electronic Circuits. Early works studied relay and switching networks, but
due to the underlying abstraction provided by Kleene logic, there is no qualitative difference to
modern electronic circuits. To our knowledge, Goto [Got49] was the first to publish a hazard-free
multiplexer. Huffman [Huf57] provided the first general construction of hazard-free circuits.
By the late 70’s, there was an intense debate among hardware developers whether the problem
of metastability can be dealt with deterministically, by suitable design of circuits [Pec76, Wor77,
Mar77, SC79]. Metastability denotes an unstable third equilibrium state of bistable elements,
such as latches and flip-flops. Metastability can lead to late output transitions of such elements,
conflicting interpretations of the stored value, or even metastability of downstream circuit compo-
nents, breaking the abstraction of Boolean logic. Marino [Mar81] resolved this question by giving
a topological argument that metastability cannot be avoided in general. Two main strategies are
in use to handle this problem. The first is based on timing guarantees, which is infeasible when
communicating across boundaries of different clock domains or when taking and digitally storing
measurements of continuously-valued variables. In such cases, so-called synchronizers are em-
ployed, see, e.g., [Kin08, Chap. 2]. Synchronizers trade time for decreased probability of ongoing
metastability (and thus resulting errors).
Another option applicable in some cases connects this discussion to hazards and Kleene logic:
logical masking (c.f. [SKK+02]). By this term, hardware designers refer to the property of basic
gates to output a stable value if the stable inputs determine this value. Put differently, hazard-free
circuits are “maximally logically masking.” It may hence surprise that the respective literature does
not mention Huffman’s work, suggesting that it has been overlooked due to different terminology.
Metastability-Containing Control Loops. Friedrichs et al. [FFL18] proposed the use of
hazard-free (or “metastability-containing”) circuits in mixed-signal control loops. Mixed-signal
circuits combine both analog and digital elements, which here means that a continuously-valued
(i.e., analog) actuating variable is controlled by a digital circuit. This comes with the advantage of
standardized, small, and in particular fast digital components, but by Marino’s result mentioned
earlier [Mar81], using digital components necessarily incurs the risk of metastability.
While [FFL18] proves the approach to be feasible in principle, it leaves open the question
whether efficient solutions exist. In light of this, [FFL18] points out that Gray codes offer
imprecision-1, too, providing hope that small circuits are a possibility. In [FKLP17], it is shown
that imprecision-1 Gray code time measurements can be obtained by practical circuits. Astonish-
ingly, the measurement circuit produces the same k-recoverable codes we give in this work, as an
intermediate result before conversion to imprecision-1 Gray code. These codes emerge naturally in
this context for a completely different reason, suggesting that they are of general significance.
Complexity of Hazard-free Circuits. In [IKL+18] it was shown that for monotone functions,
their hazard-free complexity (i.e., the size of the smallest hazard-free implementation) equals their
monotone complexity (i.e., the size of the smallest implementation without negation gates). This
yields a number of unconditional lower bounds as corollaries of results on monotone circuits. In
particular, an exponential separation between hazard-free and standard circuit complexity follows
from [AB87, Tar88], and the naive monotone circuit of cubic size for Boolean matrix multiplication
is optimal [Pat75, MG76]. These lower bounds are complemented by a general construction yielding
circuits of size nO(k)|C| without k-bit hazards, where C is an arbitrary circuit implementing the
desired function. Thus, for constant k, the overhead for removing k-bit hazards is polynomial in
n. The above separation result implies that an overhead of 2k
Ω(1)
is necessary, but it remains open
whether the task is fixed-parameter tractable w.r.t. k.
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In contrast, some functions and specific hazards admit much more efficient solutions. If the
possible positions of u inputs are restricted to index set I, a construction based on hazard-free
multiplexers avoids the respective hazards with a circuit of size O(2|I||C|) [IKL+18, Lemma 5.2],
where C is as above. This can be seen as combining speculative computing [TY12, TYM14] with
hazard-free multiplexers. Another example is given by sorting of imprecision-1 Gray code inputs,
which admit asymptotically optimal sorting networks [BLM18].
It is worth noting that the lower bound can be circumvented using non-combinational logic [FFL18].
Using clocked circuits and so-called masking registers, k-bit hazards can be eliminated with factor
O(k)-overhead. Masking registers also strictly increase the computational power of the system with
each clock cycle. However, in this work we consider combinational logic only.
Parallel Prefix Computation. The result from [BLM18] is based on an application of a special
case of the parallel prefix computation (PC) framework by Ladner and Fischer [LF80]. They
observed that any transcription function can be efficiently computed as follows:
1. For an encoding of the space of functions from S to itself, encode for input string x ∈ Σn the
function ti := t(·, xi) : S → S for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2. Compute for each i (the encoding of) the function πi := ti ◦ ti−1 ◦ . . . ◦ t1.
3. Compute si = πi(s0) for each i.
4. Compute the output o(si−1, xi) for each i.
For a constant-size Moore machine, all but the second step can be done in parallel for each i by
circuits of size O(n) and depth O(1). The second step can be performed by a circuit of size O(n)
and depth O(log n) exploiting associativity of function composition. This celebrated result yields
the only asymptotically optimal adder constructions known to date, cf. [SL15].
In [BLM18], it was possible to exploit highly convenient circumstances. First, it held that
S = Σ = B2 and t : B2 × B2 → B2 turned out to be associative. Second, also the extension of
t : T2 × T2 → T2 induced by a hazard-free circuit implementing t was associative.6 One can show
in this setting that this operator can be used directly, yielding a very efficient solution that avoids
hazards that would arise from the multi-step process laid out above.
Error Correcting and Snake-in-the-Box Codes. The properties we require from our codes
are reminiscent of error detection and correction codes (see, e.g., [MS77]). Given a imprecision-p
codeword x for p ≤ k, a k-preserving code γ is sufficiently strong to guarantee that any y ∈ res(x)
is either recognized as a non-codeword or is in γ(rx). The latter is “correct” in the sense that this
codeword is contained in the range of values that x represents. This corresponds to error detection;
e.g., a (redundant) parity bit enables noticing, but not fixing, single-bit errors.
The stronger property of k-recoverability is akin to error correction. For a recoverable code, we
can map any y ∈ res(x) back to a codeword from γ(rx) via γ(γ
−1(y)). The matching property of
an error correction code is the ability to recover the original codeword after up to k bit flips.
The requirements to our codes are less restrictive than for error detection and correction codes.
Error detection and correction necessitate Hamming distance k + 1 and 2k + 1, respectively, while
a k-recoverable code may have codewords in Hamming distance one. This holds true even for
codewords that are “far away” from each other, i.e., γ(i) and γ(j) for |j − i| ≫ k. This explains
why our codes are also less restrictive than (generalized) snake-in-the-box codes. Generalizing the
definition from [Kau58], a distance-k snake-in-the-box code satisfies that the Hamming distance
between γ(i) and γ(j) is at least min{k+1, |j−i|}, while consecutive codewords differ in a single bit
6This is not true in general, even if the original function is associative. A counter-example is given by addition
(modulo 4) of 2-bit standard binary code: (01 + 01) + 0u = 1u 6= uu = 01 + (01 + 0u).
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only. With this definition, a distance-k snake-in-the-box code is k-preserving and ⌊k/2⌋-recoverable,
respectively. In contrast, our code is not even a distance-1 snake-in-the-box.
For comparison, an n-bit code that can detect errors after up to k bit flips can by the (tight)
Hamming bound [MS77] achieve rate at most (n− ℓ)/n, where ℓ := log
(∑t
i=0
(
n
i
))
with t := ⌊k/2⌋.
For a distance-k snake-in-the-box code, a fraction of 1/(k+1) of its codewords must be mutually in
Hamming distance at least k+1, so by the same argument its rate is at most (n− ℓ− log(k+1))/n.
In contrast, we show that for k-recoverable codes ℓ ≤ 2k − 1, regardless of n.
Generality of the Model. Kleene logic has been invented and reinvented many times in different
contexts. The work by Goto [Got49] was almost certainly independent of Kleene’s [Kle38] and
remained unnoticed by the western world for decades. Likewise, Huffman’s work [Huf57] makes
no mention of Kleene logic, developing its own terms. The authors of [FFL18] were unaware of
the connection to these articles while working on early versions of the manuscript, learning later
that they reinvented the wheel, too. Similarly, related works on cybersecurity [TWM+09, HOI+12]
appear to derive from coming up with the concept independently again, although the work by Hu et
al. [HOI+12] draws the connection to Huffman via the influential work of Eichelberger on detecting
hazards [Eic65]. See [BEI01] for a survey covering some of these articles and discussing different
logics that also cover “dynamic hazards.”7
In our opinion, all of this goes to show that the questions we study in this paper are fundamental
and of widespread interest. This suggests that our results are of interest to other areas as well.
3 Hazard-free Implementation of Transcription Functions
The PC framework by Ladner and Fischer [LF80], in its most general form, computes transcription
functions of Moore machine (S, s0,Σ,Λ, t, o) as follows. It identifies
8 s ∈ S with the (column) unit
vector es ∈ B
|S|, where
(es)s′ :=
{
1 if s = s′
0 else.
Thus, functions f : S → S are represented by Boolean matrices Bf ∈ B
|S|×B|S| in the natural way,
i.e., (Bf )·s = ef(s). We get that e(f◦g)(s) = Bf · Bg · es, where · denotes the (associative) Boolean
matrix multiplication map. In particular, for all i ∈ [n+ 1], it holds that esi =
(∏i
j=1Bj
)
· es0 .
If |S| is constant, there is a constant-sized circuit implementing ·, and exploiting the associativity
of the operator, Ladner and Fischer give an O(log n)-depth O(n)-size circuit computing esi for all
i from x. Evaluating o(si−1, xi) in parallel for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then yields the output.
Our goal in this section is to adapt this approach such that we obtain hazard-free implementa-
tions of transcription functions. To simplify notation, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Hazard-free Extensions). For function f : Bn → Bm, denote by fu : T
n → Tm its
hazard-free extension defined by fu(x) := ∗y∈res(x) f(y).
Note that circuit C is a hazard-free implementation of f : Bn → Bm iff C(x) = fu(x) for all
x ∈ Tn. In other words, our goal can be rephrased as implementing τu for the given Moore machine.
7What we refer to as hazards in our paper is called “static hazards” elsewhere, as for (static) hazards the output
is supposed to undergo no change.
8This is a choice of encoding, which is implicit in the description in [LF80].
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Figure 1: A toy example. This transducer simply outputs its state with a delay of one step. The
set of states, input alphabet, and output alphabet are the same, i.e., S = Σ = Λ ⊆ B2. These sets
are encoded via standard unary encoding.
3.1 Na¨ıve Approach
At first glance, applying the same pattern to derive a hazard-free implementation of transcription
functions looks promising. First, using the above encoding and reinterpreting input symbols as
Boolean matrices “works,” in the sense that the resulting matrices over (T, or, and) faithfully
represent the hazard-free extensions of the respective functions on elements of S.
Observation 3.2. Denote by F the space of functions from S to itself and let E : Bℓ → F be
arbitrary. Then we have for all x ∈ Tℓ and s ∈ S that (BE(·) · es)u(x) =
(
∗y∈res(x)BE(y)
)
·u es.
Proof. The proof follows by using Definition 3.1 twice, and since res(s) = {s}.
(BE(·) · es)u(x) = ∗
y∈res(x)
s′∈res(s)
BE(y) · es′ = ∗
y∈res(x)
BE(y) · es =
(
∗
y∈res(x)
BE(y)
)
·u es .
Second, we can apply the machinery for associative operators developed in [LF80].
Observation 3.3 (·u is associative). For all A ∈ T
α×β, B ∈ Tβ×γ, and C ∈ Tγ×δ, we have that
(A ·u B) ·u C = A ·u (B ·u C).
Proof. As or and and are associative also on T, this follows by the same straightforward calculation
as for matrices over arbitrary (semi)rings.9
Finally, we know that ·u can be implemented by a circuit. In fact, it is straightforward to do so
with a polynomially-sized circuit.
Corollary 3.4 (of [IKL+18, Lemma 4.2]). There is a circuit of size less than 2αβγ and depth
1 + ⌈log β⌉ that computes A ·u B for matrices A ∈ T
α×β and B ∈ Tβ×γ.
Proof. The standard algorithm for Boolean matrix multiplication is monotone, i.e., does not use
negations, and requires for each of the αγ entries of A ·uB a binary tree of β and gates (the leaves)
and β − 1 or gates; monotone circuits are hazard-free.
So where do things go wrong? The culprit is the encoding of restricted transition functions,
as we can see from the toy example given in Figure 1. There, Σ = S = Λ ⊆ B2 encoded via
γ(i) = 1i02−i on domain {0, 1, 2}, s0 = γ(0), and o(γ(i), γ(j)) = γ(i), i.e., the transducer simply
outputs its state with a delay of one step. Note that γ is standard unary encoding, so one might
expect it to enable resilience to hazards.
9Note that (T, or, and) is only a (commutative) semiring, as its “addition,” i.e., or, has no inverses.
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Nonetheless, given input x = (γ(0) ∗ γ(1))γ(0)γ(2)γ(0), we have that ∗y1∈res(x1)Bt(·,y1) · es0 =
(u, u, 0)T . As (0, 0, 0)T ∈ res(u, u, 0)T , but the vector es representing state s contains a 1 for
any s ∈ S. As the all-0 vector is mapped to itself by any matrix, it follows that continuing the
computation can never lead to a vector with an entry of 1. This is bad news, as ∗y∈res(x) τ(y) =
γ(0)(γ(0) ∗ γ(1))γ(0)γ(2) — the second input makes certain that we are in state γ(0) again, and
this is reproduced by the output. Note that even when going to state γ(2), the encoding does not
reflect this, despite the fact that an input symbol γ(2) results in state γ(2) no matter what.
The underlying issue is that the chosen function encoding is not able to capture that after
processing a resolution the first input symbol (γ(0) ∗ γ(1)), the state machine is certainly in either
state γ(0) or γ(1). However, there is no certainty regarding either of the individual states, so the
chosen encoding cannot reflect this; as (0, 0, 0)T represents no state whatsoever, we have no way to
recover the correct output symbols later.10 To overcome the obstacle illustrated by this example,
we need to add further redundancy to the encoding.
A Universal Encoding for Functions
For Boolean f : Bn → Bm, we obtain fu(x) by mapping each y ∈ res(x) using f and then taking
the ∗ operation over the resulting set. The latter may—depending on x and the encoding— lose
information, as res(fu(x)) may be a strict superset of f(res(x)). This becomes problematic when
we subsequently apply some function g that is constant on f(res(x)), but not on res(fu(x)); we
then get that u = gu(fu(x)) 6= (g ◦ f)u(x) ∈ B.
The key idea underlying our approach is to maintain the information that f maps res(x) to
f(res(x)) in the encoding, by storing for each A ⊆ Bn and B ⊆ Bm whether f(A) ⊆ B. When
concatenating functions, we then can retrieve the information that g ◦ f is constant on res(x) and
use the resulting stable 1 to “suppress” the uncertainty the above simpler encoding cannot handle
using an or operation.
Definition 3.5 (Universal Function Encoding). Given function f : S → T , define
∀A ⊆ S,B ⊆ T : (Mf )BA :=
{
1 if f(A) ⊆ B
0 else.
Thus, Mf is a Boolean 2
|T | × 2|S| matrix. Moreover, for s ∈ S and A ⊆ S, define e(s) via e
(s)
A := 1
if s ∈ A and e
(s)
A := 0 else. Hence, for all B ⊆ T we have that
(
Mf · e
(s)
)
B
= 1 iff f(s) ∈ B.
To see how this encoding helps, consider the example from Figure 1 once more, with the same
input string. The matrix representation of f := tu(·, x1) = t(·, γ(0)) ∗ t(·, γ(1)) has an entry of
1 = 1 ∗ 1 at row index B = {0, 1} and column index A = {0}, as both t(·, γ(0)) and t(·, γ(1)) map
0 to an element of B. Moreover, g := tu(·, x2) = t(·, γ(0)) maps B back to A, implying that the
respective matrix has a 1 at row index A and column index B. A simplified version of the matrices
can be seen in Figure 2. When multiplying the matrices, the resulting matrix has at index pair
(A,A) the “sum” (i.e., the or) over all sets C of the “product” (i.e., the and) of whether f maps A
to C and also g maps C back to A. As the or is stable when having at least one stable 1 as input
due to the above observation on B, we “learn” that g ◦ f maps the initial state 0 to itself, i.e., the
product has a stable 1 at index pair (A,A).
Similar considerations show that we get stable entries of 0 whenever it is certain that some
set is not mapped to a subset of another. This is captured by the following theorem, which is the
stepping stone to proving Theorem 3.13.
10One may interpret (0, 0, 0)T as a single other state, but this static assignment cannot always be correct.
Mg ·u Mf =
∅ {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} S


∅ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0{0} 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
...
·u
∅ {0}



∅ 1 0
{0} 1 u
{1} 1 u
{2} 1 0
{0, 1} 1 1 . . .
{0, 2} 1 u
{1, 2} 1 u
S 1 1
=
∅ {0}


∅ 1 0 . . .{0} 1 1 . . .
...
Figure 2: Example of the matrix encoding applied on the toy example. For f := t(·, γ(0))∗t(·, γ(1))
column A = {0} of matrix Mf contains a 1 at row index B = {0, 1}, since f maps state 0 to all
states in B. Rows {0} and {1} contain u because they do not contain all possible states. Since
g := t(·, γ(0)), Mg does not contain u.
Theorem 3.6. Let fj : S → T for all j ∈ [ℓ], gi : T → U for all i ∈ [ℓ
′], A ⊆ S, and C ⊆ U . Then((
∗
i∈[ℓ′]
Mgi
)
·u
(
∗
j∈[ℓ]
Mfj
))
CA
=
(
∗
(i,j)∈[ℓ]×[ℓ′]
Mgi◦fj
)
CA
.
Theorem 3.6 implies that we can decompose computation of τu(x) into mapping each symbol
xi to ∗yi∈res(xi)Mt(·,yi), multiplying the resulting matrices, and then using the result to determine
the output symbols from the starting state and the input symbols. By Observation 3.3, we can
exploit the associativity of the matrix product to obtain an efficient circuit in the vein of [LF80],
yielding Theorem 3.13. The remainder of this section is dedicated to proving the above theorem
and this conclusion.
We first show that, also for this encoding, function composition maps to matrix multiplication.
Lemma 3.7. For functions f : S → T , g : T → U , it holds that Mg · Mf =Mg◦f .
Proof. Suppose (Mg◦f )CA = 1 for C ⊆ U and A ⊆ S, i.e., (g ◦ f)(A) = g(f(A)) ⊆ C. Thus,
((Mg) · (Mf ))CA =
∑
B⊆T
(Mg)CB (Mf )BA ≥ (Mg)Cf(A) (Mf )f(A)A = 1 · 1 = 1 .
Now consider the case that (Mg◦f )CA = 0 for C ⊆ U and A ⊆ S, i.e., there is some a ∈ A so that
g(f(a)) /∈ C. Accordingly,
∀B ⊆ T : (Mf )BA = 1⇔ f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ g(B) 6⊆ C ⇔ (Mg)CB = 0 .
Thus, for all B ⊆ T , we have that (Mf )BA (Mg)CB = 0, leading to
(Mg ·Mf )CA =
∑
B⊆T
(Mg)CB (Mf )BA = 0 .
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Next, we need to understand how multiplying such matrices plays out when the operands are
not stable. The following definition and the subsequent lemma offer a respective characterization.
Definition 3.8. For A ∈ Tα×β and b ∈ B, define A(b) ∈ Bα×β via
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , α} × {1, . . . , β} : A
(b)
ij :=
{
b if Aij ∈ {b, u}
1− b if Aij = 1− b .
Lemma 3.9. For all G ∈ Tα×β and F ∈ Tβ×γ, it holds that G ·u F = ∗
{
G(0) · F (0), G(1) · F (1)
}
.
Proof. Fix any i ∈ {1, . . . , γ} and j ∈ {1, . . . , α}. If (G ·u F )ij = b ∈ B, the fact that G
(0), G(1) ∈
res(G) and F (0), F (1) ∈ res(F ) imply that also
(
∗
{
G(0) · F (0), G(1) · F (1)
})
ij
= b.
Now consider the case that (G ·u F )ij = u. Thus, there are G
′, G′′ ∈ res(G) and F ′, F ′′ ∈ res(F )
satisfying that (G′ · F ′)ij = 0 and (G
′′ · F ′′)ij = 1, respectively. It follows that
(
G(0) · F (0)
)
ij
=
β∑
k=1
G
(0)
ik F
(0)
kj ≤
β∑
k=1
G′ikF
′
kj =
(
G′ · F ′
)
ij
= 0
and, analogously, (
G(1) · F (1)
)
ij
≥
(
G′′ · F ′′
)
ij
= 1 .
Together, this implies that
(
∗
{
G(0) · F (0), G(1) · F (1)
})
ij
= ∗
{(
G(0) · F (0)
)
ij
,
(
G(1) · F (1)
)
ij
}
= ∗{0, 1} = u .
Equipped with these technical statements, we are now in position to prove the key technical
result of this section.
Theorem 3.6. Let fj : S → T for all j ∈ [ℓ], gi : T → U for all i ∈ [ℓ
′], A ⊆ S, and C ⊆ U . Then((
∗
i∈[ℓ′]
Mgi
)
·u
(
∗
j∈[ℓ]
Mfj
))
CA
=
(
∗
(i,j)∈[ℓ]×[ℓ′]
Mgi◦fj
)
CA
.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, for each i and j we have thatMgi◦fj =Mgi ·Mfj . Observe that ∗A  ∗B
for A ⊆ B, where  is defined by the partial order b ≺ u for b ∈ B. Moreover, X ⊆ res(∗X) for
any set X. Thus,((
∗
i∈[ℓ′]
Mgi
)
·u
(
∗
j∈[ℓ]
Mfj
))
CA
= ∗
(
res
(
∗
i∈[ℓ′]
Mgi
)
· res
(
∗
j∈[ℓ]
Mfj
))
CA

(
∗
(i,j)∈[ℓ′]×[ℓ]
Mgi · Mfj
)
CA
=
(
∗
(i,j)∈[ℓ′]×[ℓ]
Mgi◦fj
)
CA
.
the claimed equality follows if the l.h.s. equals b ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, assume that the l.h.s. equals u.
We apply Lemma 3.9 with G = ∗i∈[ℓ′]Mgi and F = ∗j∈[ℓ]Mfj , yielding that((
G(0) · F (0)
)
CA
= 0
)
∧
((
G(1) · F (1)
)
CA
= 1
)
,
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which by Definition 3.8 is equivalent to
∀B ⊆ T ∃(i, j) ∈ [1, ℓ′]× [1, ℓ] : (Mgi)CB = 0 ∨
(
Mfj
)
BA
= 0 (3.10)
∃B1 ⊆ T ∃(i, j) ∈ [1, ℓ
′]× [1, ℓ] : (Mgi)CB1 =
(
Mfj
)
B1A
= 1 . (3.11)
Set B0 :=
⋃
j∈[ℓ] fj(A). As thus fj(A) ⊆ B0 by construction, it holds that
(
Mfj
)
B0A
= 1 for all j.
Equation (3.10) thus entails that
∃i ∈ [ℓ′] : (Mgi)CB0 = 0⇔ gi(B0) 6⊆ C .
Hence, there is an x ∈ B0 satisfying that gi0(x) /∈ C for an i0 ∈ [ℓ
′]. By construction, x ∈ fj0(A) for
some j0 ∈ [ℓ], yielding that (gi0 ◦ fj0)(A) = gi0(fj0(A)) 6⊆ C. We conclude that
(
Mgi0◦fj0
)
CA
= 0.
Now consider Equation (3.11), which says that there are indices i1 ∈ [ℓ
′] and j1 ∈ [ℓ] such
that gi1(B1) ⊆ C and fj1(A) ⊆ B1. This immediately yields that (gi1 ◦ fj1)(A) ⊆ C and thus(
Mgi1◦fj1
)
CA
= 1. Thus
(
∗{Mgi◦fj | i ∈ [ℓ
′] ∧ j ∈ [ℓ]}
)
CA
= ∗
{(
Mgi◦fj
)
CA
∣∣∣ i ∈ [ℓ′] ∧ j ∈ [ℓ]} = ∗{0, 1} = u .
The following corollary readily follows by inductive application of Theorem 3.6.
Corollary 3.12. Suppose for i ∈ [n], we are given mappings Ei : B
ℓi → Fi to function spaces Fi,
such that for all i ∈ [n− 1] the codomain of functions from Fi equals the domain of functions from
Fi+1. Let E denote a function that maps x ∈
∏n−1
i=0 B
ℓi to ◦n−1i=0 Ei(xi). Then, for all x ∈
∏n−1
i=0 T
ℓi,
(ME)u (x) =
(
MEn−1
)
u
(xn−1) ·u
(
MEn−2
)
u
(xn−2) ·u . . . ·u (ME0)u (x0) .
Applying the corollary to the transducer’s transcription function yields the decomposition we
need to apply the framework from [LF80] to obtain an efficient circuit, i.e., prove Theorem 3.13.
Theorem 3.13. For any ℓ, n ∈ N and Moore machine T = (S, s0,Σ ⊆ B
ℓ,Λ, t, o), there is a
hazard-free circuit of size O
((
2ℓ+2|S| + 23|S|
)
n
)
and depth O (ℓ+ |S| log n) implementing τT,n.
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume that Σ = Bℓ; otherwise fix an arbitrary extension of t to the domain S×Bℓ.
Moreover, assume for now that Λ = B; the generalization is straightforward and follows at the end
of the proof. Thus, for input x ∈ Tn·ℓ, the i-th output symbol of a hazard-free implementation of
the transcription function equals
τu(x)i = ∗
y∈res(x)
o(si−1(y), yi) = ∗
y∈res(x)
o((◦i−1j=1t(·, yj))(s0), yi) = ∗
y∈res(x)
o(·, yi) ◦
(
◦i−1j=1t(·, yj)
)
(s0) .
We apply Corollary 3.12 to Ei(yi) = o(·, yi) and Ej(yj) = t(·, yj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}, yielding
that
(ME)u (x) = (MEi)u (xi) ·u
(
MEi−1
)
u
(xi−1) ·u . . . ·u (ME1)u (x1) , (3.14)
where, by construction, (E(y))(s0) =
(
◦ij=1Ej(yj)
)
(s0) = τ(y)i for all y ∈
∏n
j=1 B
ℓ. Recall that
by Definition 3.5, for function f : S → Λ and {1} ⊂ Λ = B,
(
Mf · e
(s0)
)
{1}
= 1 iff f(s0) = 1. Thus,
τu(x)i =
(
∗
y∈res(x)
ME(y) · e
(s0)
)
{1}
=
(
(ME)u (x) ·u e
(s0)
)
{1}
= ((ME)u (x)){1}{s0} ,
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where the second equality follows analogously to Observation 3.2. It is hence sufficient to provide
a circuit of the claimed size and depth computing this value for all i ∈ [n+1]\{0}. To this end, we
compute the entries of the corresponding matrices of the rhs of Equation (3.14), that is, we compute
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} and each A,B ⊆ S by using a hazard-free multiplexer (cf. [IKL+18,
Lemma 5.1]) the mapping of xj to
((
MEj
)
u
(xj)
)
BA
= ∗
yj∈res(xj)
{
1 if t(A, yj) ⊆ B
0 else.
Note that it suffices to perform this computation once for each index j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. As the
size of each such multiplexer is O(|Σ|) = O(2ℓ), the total size of these subcircuits is therefore in
O(2ℓ22|S|n); the depth of each such multiplexer is O(ℓ).
Similarly, we use hazard-free multiplexers to compute for each A ⊆ S
(
(MEi)u (xi)
)
{1}A
= ∗
yj∈res(xj)
{
1 if o(A, yj) = 1
0 else.
This results total size O(2ℓ2|S|n) and depth O(ℓ).
Finally, we need to perform the matrix multiplication operations. By Corollary 3.4, we can
multiply 2|S| by 2|S| matrices using O(23|S|) gates and depth O(|S|), and by Observation 3.3, ◦u is
associative. Thus, we can plug the matrix multiplication circuit into the construction from [LF80],
yielding a circuit of total size O(23|S|n) and depth O(|S| log n) computing all required products
except for the final multiplication with (MEi)u (xi), the matrix representing the output function.
Here, β = γ = |S| and α = 2|B| = 4 in the application of Corollary 3.4, so the total size is bounded
by O(22|S|n) and the depth bound is the same.
Altogether, we arrive at size O((23|S| + 22|S|+ℓ)n) and depth O(ℓ + |S| log n), completing the
proof for the special case Λ = B. For the general case, the only change is that we have to assemble
separate matrices for each bit of each output symbol and multiply them with the computed products(
MEi−1
)
u
(xi−1) ◦u . . . ◦u (ME1)u (x1). However, the number of possible distinct functions resulting
from mapping a stable input symbol to a (restricted) output function is bounded by 2|S|, implying
that this is the maximum number of bits we need to compute; further bits are simply copies of
others that can be provided by additional output wires without adding gates. Thus, we replace
additive O(2ℓ2|S|n) and O(22|S|n) terms by O(2ℓ+2|S|n) and O(23|S|n) terms, respectively, while
the depth of the circuit does not change. This shows the claimed bounds for the general case,
completing the proof.
We remark that in the case of Σ ⊂ Bℓ the choice how to extend t to the domain S × Bℓ
matters. Despite the fact that we “merely” choose how to treat non-input symbols, it is possible
that an unstable input resolves to such a symbol. If this happens, the choice of where t maps this
resolution to affects the value the hazard-free extension takes. A “bad” extension may result in
unstable output without need, decreasing the usefulness of the constructed circuit.
Fortunately, when using a k-recoverable encoding of the input, the extension of the decoding
function to non-codewords induces a suitable extension of t in a natural way. We see this as another
indicator that k-recoverability is a central property of codes in the context of hazard-free circuits.
We conclude this section with a slight generalization of Theorem 3.13 that will be useful in
Section 5. Instead of allowing only a single pass over the input and having to generate the output
right away, we give our transducers the additional power to perform some “preprocessing,” by
traversing the input string to compute, e.g., a parity bit. Such preprocessing runs can be simulated
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by a “standard” transducer, by first copying the input and then separating it by a new input symbol
‘|’ that is added to the input alphabet. The transducer is then allowed to produce arbitrary output
symbols during the initial pass over the first copy of the input, and we later only use the output
generated in the second pass.
Corollary 3.15. Let M = (SM , sM ,Σ, tM ) be a finite state machine, i.e.,
• SM is the state space,
• sM is the starting state,
• Σ ⊆ Bℓ is the input alphabet, and
• tM : SM × Σ→ SM is the state transition function.
Moreover, let T = (S, s0,Σ,Λ, t, o) be a Moore machine, ∆: SM → S, and σ an arbitrary permuta-
tion on {1, . . . , n}, for some n ∈ N. Consider the Boolean function τ : Σn → Λn defined as follows.
Given x ∈ Σn, let M process the input string xσ(1)xσ(2) . . . xσ(n), resulting in final state s ∈ SM .
Then let T process x with starting state ∆(s), yielding the output. Then τu can be implemented by
a circuit of size 2O(|SM |+|S|+ℓ)n and depth O(ℓ+ (|SM |+ |S|) log n).
Proof. Set Σ′ := Bℓ+1 and embed Σ into Σ′ by via ι(x)i := xi0, i.e., by padding each input symbol
with a trailing 0. Define the new symbol | := 0ℓ1 ∈ Σ′. Define x′ := ι(xσ(1)xσ(2) . . . xσ(n))|ι(x).
Define a new Moore machine processing input x′ in the following way. The state space is SM ∪˙S and
the starting state sM . The input alphabet is Σ
′ and the output alphabet Λ. The state transition
function is given by the state transition functions of the individual machines for all inputs with a
trailing 0 and by ∆ on input symbol |. The output function is given by o on states from S (ignoring
the trailing 0 of input symbols) and arbitrary on other states.
As can be easily verified, the resulting Moore machine implements τ on Boolean inputs, if
we simply ignore all outputs until | has been processed. As the length of x′ is up to a constant
factor that of x and x′ can be obtained by a trivial circuit, the claim now is immediate from
Theorem 3.13.
4 Preserving and Recoverable Codes
In this work, we focus on non-lossy codes. For this reason, we require encoding functions to be
injective. We now state the core definition characterizing the codes we need to efficiently avoid the
k-bit hazards of relevance to us.
Definition 4.1 (k-preserving & recoverable Codes). A code is an injective function γ : [M ]→ Bn
(where [M ] := {0, . . . ,M−1}), whose image is the set of codewords. By γ−1 we denote the decoding
function, i.e., the inverse of γ on its image. For range r = 〈i, i + k〉M , where 〈i, i + k〉M denotes
k+1 consecutive integers modulo M starting at i, define xr := ∗ γ(r) as the corresponding extended
codeword and define its range as rxr := r.
(i) For extended codeword x, px := |rx| − 1 is its imprecision (i.e., codewords are 0-imprecise).
(ii) Let k ∈ N0. Code γ is k-preserving, iff for all p ≤ k and p-imprecise extended codewords x it
holds that γ([M ]) ∩ res(x) = γ(rx). That is, res(x) does not contain “new” codewords which
are not in γ(rx).
(iii) Let k ∈ N0. Code γ is k-recoverable, iff there is an extension of γ
−1 to Bn (i.e., the entire
codomain of γ) such that for all extended codewords x of imprecision px ≤ k and all y ∈ res(x)
it holds that γ−1(y) ∈ rx.
Note that γ being k-recoverable is at least as restrictive as it being k-preserving: the latter is
a necessary condition for the extension of γ−1 required by the former to exist.
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Put simply, a k-preserving code “preserves” an uncertainty of up to k, which corresponds to
detecting an error in the terminology of error correcting codes. If the code is also recoverable,
we can also “correct” errors, in the sense that we can map the string after resolution back to a
codeword from the original range of represented values.
In order to guarantee k-recoverability, a code must have at least k (almost) redundant bits.
Theorem 4.2. For k, n ∈ N, no code γ : [(k + 1) · 2n−k]→ Bn is p-recoverable for p > k.
Proof. Consider any k-recoverable code γ on domain [M ] for some M ∈ N. For i ∈ [M − k], set
x := γ(i). For j ∈ [k+1], we show by induction that γ(i) and γ(i+j) have Hamming distance j. The
base case j = 0 is trivial. For the step from j to j+1, consider y = x〈i,i+j〉M . As γ is k-preserving,
the only codewords that res(y) contains are γ(i), . . . , γ(i + j). Accordingly, γ(i + j + 1) /∈ res(y)
must differ from y in a stable bit. However, y = γ(i) ∗ γ(i + 1) ∗ . . . ∗ γ(i + j), implying that
γ(i), . . . , γ(i+ j) agree on this bit. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, γ(i) and γ(i+ j + 1) have
Hamming distance j + 1.
Using that the code is k-preserving once more, we get that res(x〈i,i+k〉M ) contains exactly the
codewords i to i + k. Moreover, as shown above, γ(i) and γ(i + k) have Hamming distance k,
implying that | res(x〈i,i+k〉M )| = 2
k.
Now fix M = (k + 1) · 2n−k. The sets Sℓ := {γ ((k + 1)ℓ) , . . . , γ ((k + 1)(ℓ + 1)− 1)}, where
ℓ ∈ [2n−k], form a partition of the codewords. Because γ is k-recoverable, γ−1 can be extended
such that for each ℓ ∈ [2n−k], γ−1(res(∗Sℓ)) ⊆ {(k + 1)ℓ, . . . , (k + 1)(l + 1)− 1}. Hence, it follows
that res(∗Sℓ) ∩ res(∗Sℓ′) = ∅ for all ℓ 6= ℓ′ ∈ [2n−k]. As | res(∗Sℓ)| = 2k for each ℓ ∈ [2n−k], the
codomain of γ has size at least 2n, proving the claim of the theorem.
In particular, Theorem 4.2 implies that unary code on M − 1 bits is the shortest code that has
M codewords and guarantees (M −1)-recoverability. Once we fix these constraints, the only choice
left is to pick γ(0) and the order in which bits are flipped. Bounding k is thus necessary to obtain
codes with less redundancy.
The next lemma sheds some light on why k-recoverability is the “right” property to ask for.
For p ≤ k, with a k-recoverable code we can implement any function f : [M ] → Bm by a circuit
mapping imprecision-p codewords x to ∗i∈rx f(i). This should be read as having information on
a range the input is from and obtaining the most precise output that is possible in Kleene logic
under this assumption.
Lemma 4.3. Let f : [M ]→ Bm. For any k-recoverable code γ : [M ]→ Bn, there is a combinational
circuit C satisfying for all p ≤ k and p-imprecise codewords x that
C(x) = ∗
i∈rx
f(i) .
Proof. Since γ is k-recoverable, there is a an extension of γ−1 to Bn such that for all p-imprecise
extended codewords x we have that γ−1(res(x)) ⊆ rx (see Definition 4.1, Item iii). As x = ∗i∈rx γ(i),
we also have that γ(i) ∈ res(x) for all i ∈ rx and hence γ
−1(res(x)) = rx.
We take a hazard-free multiplexer circuit with n control bits and, accordingly, 2n selectable
inputs. The input corresponding to control string x ∈ Bn is fed the (constant, as known a priori)
string f(γ−1(x)). We then use the input x ∈ Tn to the circuit as control string of the multiplexer.
As the multiplexer is hazard-free, it outputs for p-imprecise codeword x (where p ≤ k)
∗
y∈res(x)
f(γ−1(y)) = ∗
i∈γ−1(res(x))
f(i) = ∗
i∈rx
f(i) .
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Table 1: 4-bit binary reflected Gray code. Note that this code is already 1-preserving.
# rg4 # rg4 # rg4 # rg4
0 0 000 4 0 110 8 1 100 12 1 010
1 0 001 5 0 111 9 1 101 13 1 011
2 0 011 6 0 101 10 1 111 14 1 001
3 0 010 7 0 100 11 1 110 15 1 000
In particular, any two k-recoverable codes with the same number M of codewords can be
mapped to each other by a circuit that translates for p ≤ k all imprecision-k codewords to their
counterparts.
Corollary 4.4. Let γ : [M ] → Bn and γ′ : [M ] → Bm be k-recoverable codes. There is a circuit
mapping for all r := 〈i, i + p〉, where p ≤ k and i ∈ [M − p], the imprecision-p codeword ∗i∈r γ(i)
to ∗i∈r γ′(i).
Proof. Apply Lemma 4.3 to code γ and the function γ′.
These statements together essentially tell that k-recoverable codes permit to jump back and
forth between encodings freely without losing precision, so long as the imprecision is limited to k.
Note, however, that the above implementation is not efficient, as the multiplexer circuit is of size
exponential in n, even if k is small. In Section 5, we will use the machinery from Section 3 to
obtain an efficient circuit for addition. The remainder of this section is dedicated to developing a
recoverable code for which we can do so.
4.1 Constructing a k-Preserving, ⌈k/2⌉-Recoverable code
Roughly speaking, our code is a hybrid of binary reflected Gray code and standard unary code. We
start by introducing these codes individually.
Reflected Gray Code.
Definition 4.5 (rgn). We define n-bit binary reflected Gray code (cf. Table 1), rgn : [2
n] → Bn,
recursively. A 1-bit code is given by rg1(0) = 0 and rg1(1) = 1. For n > 1, we start with the first
bit fixed to 0 and counting with rgn−1(·) (for the first 2
n−1 codewords), then toggle the first bit to 1,
and finally “count down” rgn−1(·) while fixing the first bit again, cf. Table 1. Formally, this yields
for x ∈ [N ]
rgn(x) :=
{
0 rgn−1(x) if x ∈ [2
n−1]
1 rgn−1(2
n − 1− x) if x ∈ [2n] \ [2n−1] .
As each n-bit string is a codeword, the code is a bijection. Observe that exactly one bit is
flipped in each two consecutive codewords, making the code a Gray code. This implies that the
code is 1-recoverable, and it matches the bound from Theorem 4.2. Our goal is to generalize to a
construction providing a k-recoverable code.
The parity of a bit string is defined as the xor over all bits.
Definition 4.6. The parity par: Bn → B of a bit string z ∈ Bn, where n ∈ N, is
par(z) :=
n⊕
i=1
zi ,
18
where for x, y ∈ B, x⊕ y := xor(x, y).
Equivalently, reflected Gray code can be defined in a left-recursive manner.
Lemma 4.7. For n ∈ N, the reflected Gray code of ℓ ∈ [2n], is given by
rgn(ℓ) = rgn−1(⌊ℓ/2⌋)(par(rgn−1(⌊ℓ/2⌋)) ⊕ (ℓ mod 2)) .
Proof. Taking every second codeword and removing the last bit reproduces the list of codewords
of rgn−1, i.e., rgn(ℓ)1,n−1 = rgn−1(⌊ℓ/2⌋). Concerning the last bit, observe that it toggles on every
up-count to an odd encoded number. As the parity of the (n− 1)-bit prefix of the code changes on
every up-count to an even encoded number, the claim follows.
This yields a simple left-recursive characterization of the decoding function, which will come in
handy later.
Corollary 4.8. For all n ∈ N and x ∈ Bn,
rg−1n (x) = 2 rg
−1
n−1(x1,n−1) + par(x) .
Unary Code. From Theorem 4.2, we know that for k > 1, we need to add redundancy to the
code. The proof of the theorem actually guides the design further: We must toggle k + 1 distinct
bits on k + 1 consecutive up-counts, or the code cannot be k-recoverable. This implies that the
subcode for such consecutive codewords is actually unary. It turns out11 that one can reuse the
“same” unary subcode repeatedly, with the modification that the bits are toggled in the same order
every time the code is reused.
Definition 4.9 (ξn and ξ¯n). For n ∈ N0 and i ∈ [n+ 1], define
ξn(i) := 1
i0n−i and ξ¯n(i) := ξn(i) = 0
i1n−i .
Clearly, both ξn and ξ¯n are Gray codes.
Observation 4.10. Concatenating the list of codewords of ξn([n]) and ξ¯n([n]) yields an n-preserving
cyclic code of 2n words.
Proof. The claim is readily verified for the segment 1n−j0j for j ∈ [n]. The general case of segments
starting at some x ∈ Bn follows by observing that the bit-wise xor with x rotates the cycle so that
x becomes 0n.
The Hybrid Code. We define our n-bit k-preserving code γn,k : [(k + 1) · 2
n−k] → Bn by
combining the two above codes as follows.
Definition 4.11 (γn,k). γn,k consists of two parts, where the front part is a binary reflected Gray
code of n − k bits rgn−k and the rear part keeps repeating ξk and ξ¯k alternatingly. The front part
“counts up” on every (k + 1)-th up-count of the compound code, and its current parity decides on
the values of the rear part for these consecutive up-counts. If it is 0, then we use ξk, if it is 1, we
use ξ¯k. That is,
γn,k(i) := rgn−k(⌊i/(k + 1)⌋)
{
ξk(i mod (k + 1)) if par(rgn−k(⌊i/(k + 1)⌋)) = 0
ξ¯k(i mod (k + 1)) if par(rgn−k(⌊i/(k + 1)⌋)) = 1 .
11In hindsight, the proof of Theorem 4.2 strongly suggests this.
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rg2, ξ2 # rg2, ξ2 # rg2, ξ2 # rg2, ξ2 #
00 00 0 01 11 3 11 00 6 10 11 9
00 u0 − 01 u1 − 11 u0 − 10 1u −
00 10 1 01 01 4 11 10 7 10 10 10
00 1u − 01 0u − 11 1u − 10 u0 −
00 11 2 01 00 5 11 01 8 10 00 11
0u 11 − u1 00 − 1u 11 − − −
Table 2: A 4-bit 1-recoverable code. The front part of the code consists of 2-bit Gray code rg2,
and the rear part of the code, ξ2, toggles between 2-bit standard unary code and its complement.
The 1-imprecise extended codewords are denoted by ‘-’ and appear in between their corresponding
codewords, e.g., 00u0 = ∗γ(〈0, 1〉M ).
See Table 2 for an example.
Observation 4.12. For every i ∈ [M ], where M := (k + 1) · 2n−k, and j ∈ [k + 1], the Hamming
distance of γn,k(i)1,n−k and γn,k(i+ j mod M)1,n−k is at most 1.
It is easy to verify that this code is k-preserving.
Lemma 4.13. γn,k is k-preserving.
Proof. Consider imprecision-p codeword x for p ≤ k. By Observation 4.12, at most one bit among
the first n−k bits of x equals u. If there is no such bit, the claim is immediate from Observation 4.10.
If there is such a bit, we can interpret this bit (or its complement) as an additional bit in the unary
code (resulting in a cyclic code of 2k + 2 words), and the claim follows from Observation 4.10 as
well.
The resolution of a bit string may result in non-codewords. Hence, we extend the decoding
function to all bit strings.
Definition 4.14 (Extension of γ−1n,k). First, we define mappings u : B
k × B → ξk([k + 1]) and
u¯ : Bk×B→ ξ¯k([k+1]) from bit strings to our unary encodings. For z ∈ B
k, the mappings produce
a codeword sharing either the longest prefix or suffix with z, depending on the second input. That
is, for b ∈ B let ℓmaxb be the maximal index such that zℓmaxb = b or 0 if ∀i : zi = b¯, and ℓ
min
b be the
minimal index such that zℓmin
b
= b or k + 1 if ∀i : zi = b¯. Then we define
u(z, 0) := 1ℓ
min
0 −10k−ℓ
min
0 +1 , u(z, 1) := 1ℓ
max
1 0k−ℓ
max
1 ,
u(z, 1) := 0ℓ
min
1 −11k−ℓ
min
1 +1 , u(z, 0) := 0ℓ
max
0 1k−ℓ
max
0 .
Note that u(z, x) = u(z, x).
For an arbitrary bit string x ∈ Bn, we define
u(x) := u(xn−k+1,n, xn−k+⌊k/2⌋+1) and u¯(x) := u¯(xn−k+1,n, xn−k+⌊k/2⌋+1)
and
γ−1n,k(x) = x1,n−k
{
u(x) if par(x1,n−k) = 0
u¯(x) if par(x1,n−k) = 1 .
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Note that for codewords x, γn,k(γ
−1
n,k(x)) = x, as then u(xn−k+1,n, 0) = u(xn−k+1,n, 1) =
xn−k+1,n if par(x1,n−k) = 0 and u(xn−k+1,n, 0) = u(xn−k+1,n, 1) = xn−k+1,n if par(x1,n−k) = 1,
i.e., the above definition indeed provides an extension of the decoding function γ−1n,k to B
n. We now
prove that this extension shows γ to be ⌈k/2⌉-recoverable.
Theorem 4.15. γn,k : [(k + 1) · 2
n−k]→ Bn is ⌈k/2⌉-recoverable.
Proof. Throughout this proof, write x = yz for all x ∈ Tn with y ∈ Tn−k and z ∈ Tk. We need to
show that for any p ≤ ⌈k/2⌉ and imprecision-⌈k/2⌉ codeword x, we have that γ−1n,k(x) ⊆ rx, where
γ−1n,k is extended to B
n according to Definition 4.14. Accordingly, fix r = 〈i, i + p〉(k+1)2n−k for any
i ∈ (k + 1)2n−k and p ≤ ⌈k/2⌉. W.l.o.g., assume that i+ p < (k + 1)2n; otherwise, simply take all
respective values modulo (k + 1)2n. Set x(j) := γ(i+ j) for all j ∈ [p + 1] and x := xr = ∗j∈r x(j)
for the remainder of the proof. Moreover, for i ∈ N, abbreviate i := ⌊i/(k + 1)⌋.
Suppose first that i = i+ p. Then y(j) = rgn−k(i) = y for all j ∈ [p + 1]. If i ∈ 2N0,
z(j) = 1ℓj0k−ℓj , where ℓj = i − (k + 1)i + j. Thus, x = y1
ℓ
u
p0k−ℓ−p, where ℓ = i − (k + 1)i. It
is now immediate that for any resolution x′ ∈ res(x), we have that u(z′, z′1+⌊k/2⌋) = z(j) for some
j ∈ [p+ 1], implying that γ−1n,k(x
′) ∈ r. Analogous reasoning shows the same for y ∈ 2N0 + 1.
Hence, consider the case that i = i+ p − 1, i.e., the front part (i.e., the (n − k)-bit prefix) of
γn,k performs an up-count within r. We claim that this implies that z1+⌊k/2⌋ = b ∈ B, i.e., all
resolutions of x agree on z1+⌊k/2⌋. To see this, observe that after changing the bit in the sequence
given by r, only bits zi with i ≤ p − 1 ≤ ⌈k/2⌉ < 1 + ⌊k/2⌋ can change, and before changing the
bit in the front part, only bits zi with i ≥ k − (p − 2) ≥ k − ⌈k/2⌉ + 2 > ⌊k/2⌋ + 1 can change.
Suppose that the bit in the front part changes on the up-count from γ(i+ j0) to γ(i+ j0 + 1),
where j0 ∈ [p]. Consider the case that i ∈ 2N0 first. Then, reasoning as above, we get that
z = up−(j0+1)1k−p+1uj0 . In particular, z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 1. Thus, for any stabilization z
′ ∈ res(z), we
have that ξ−1k (u(z, 1)) ≥ k − j0. Thus, if for x
′ = y′z′ ∈ res(x) we have that y′ = γ(i)1,n−k, then
γ−1(x′) ∈ {ki + k − j0, . . . , ki + k}. As the up-count in the front part occurs from γ(i + j0) to
γ(i+ j0 + 1), we have that ki+ k = i+ j0, we conclude that γ
−1
n,k(x
′) ∈ r.
Similarly, any stabilization z′ ∈ res(z) satisfies that ξ¯−1k (u¯(z, 1)) ≤ p− (j0 + 1), as there can be
at most this many leading zeroes. Thus, rg−1n−k(y
′) ∈ 2N0 + 1 entails that γ
−1
n,k(x
′) ∈ {k(i + 1) +
1, . . . , k(i + 1) + p− j0} ⊂ r.
Finally, it remains to consider the case that i ∈ 2N0+1. Then z = u
p−(j0+1)0k−p+1uj0 , implying
that z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 0. We can deduce that γ
−1
n,k(x
′) ∈ r for each x′ ∈ res(x) analogously to the case
that i ∈ 2N0.
The lower bound from Theorem 4.2 matches exactly the number of codewords of γn,k, but we
can only show that the code is k-preserving. Theorem 4.15 shows the matching property of k′-
recoverability, but only for k′ = ⌈k/2⌉. This leaves open the question whether the upper bounds
are tight or some improvement is feasible.
5 k-Recoverable Addition
In this section, we utilize the results from Section 3 to provide circuits for k-recoverable addition
of γn,k, the k-preserving, ⌈k/2⌉-recoverable code given in Section 4.
Definition 5.1 (k-recoverable Addition). For code γ : [M ] → Bn, we define γ-addition in the
natural way: For codewords x, y ∈ γ[M ], x+γ y = γ(γ
−1(x)+γ−1(y) mod M). If γ is k-recoverable
for k ∈ N0, we extend this definition to all x, y ∈ B
n by the (not necessarily unique) extension of
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γ−1 to Bn, which k-recoverability guarantees. A circuit implements k-recoverable addition w.r.t.
k-recoverable code γ, iff it implements (the extended) operator +γ on extended codewords x and y
satisfying that px + py ≤ k without hazards.
This definition enforces that the circuit faithfully implements interval addition on the ranges of
the operands.
Observation 5.2. For extended codewords x and y satisfying px + py ≤ k, a k-recoverable adder
circuit outputs
x(+γ)uy = ∗
i∈rx+ry mod M
γ(i) .
Proof. Using that γ−1 maps resolutions of extended codewords back to the respective range, we
get that
x(+γ)uy = ∗
(x′,y′)∈res(x)×res(y)
γ(γ−1(x′) + γ−1(y′) mod M)
= ∗
(i,j)∈rx×ry
γ(i+ j mod M)
= ∗
i∈rx+ry mod M
γ(i) .
Note that this observation shows that on inputs with sufficiently small imprecision, the output
of the circuit does not depend on the chosen extension of γ−1 to non-codewords. Combining this
insight with Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 4.4, arguably we get a universal tool for handling addition
up to imprecision k in Kleene logic. We now proceed to deriving circuits realizing k-recoverable
addition.
5.1 Transducers for Adding Stable Strings
In order to obtain the desired circuit, we will apply Corollary 3.15, which reduces our task to
designing (due to inductive application) a sequence of finite state machines and a single final
transducer generating the output on stable strings. We cannot emphasize enough the degree to
which this simplifies the task; in fact, most of the steps turn out to be very simple. We first describe
the individual steps and then plug together the final machine.
5.1.1 Parity
The finite state machine that determines the parity of two inputs x, y ∈ Bℓ is given by Mpar :=
(Spar, 00,B
2, tpar), where the state space is Spar = B
2. The transition function tpar is defined as
follows:
(tpar(si−1, xiyi))1 := (si−1)1 ⊕ xi ,
(tpar(si−1, xiyi))2 := (si−1)2 ⊕ yi .
This is a simple product machine, where the first bit of the state encoding denotes the parity of the
first input string and the second bit the parity of the second string, respectively. The i-th input
symbol is xiyi. A visualisation of Mpar is given in Figure 3.
Observation 5.3. After processing the sequence (x1y1)(x2y2) . . . (xℓyℓ) for inputs x, y ∈ B
ℓ, Mpar
is in state par(x) par(y).
22
00 10
01 11
00
01
10
11
00
10
11
00
01
00
Figure 3: Finite state machine Tpar, computing the parities of two input strings.
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11
Figure 4: Finite state machine Mun for k = 3. Transitions for states 5 and 6 are omitted, as these
states can only be reached after processing the last input symbol.
5.1.2 Unary Addition
Finite State Machine Computing the Sum. Consider x, y ∈ ξk([k + 1]). We would like to
determine ξ−1k (x)+ ξ
−1
k (y). A simple (2k+1)-state machine is given by Mun = ([2k+1], 0,B
2, tun),
where the transition function is
tun(si−1, 00) := si−1 ,
tun(si−1, 01) := (si−1 + 1) mod (2k + 1) ,
tun(si−1, 10) := (si−1 + 1) mod (2k + 1) ,
tun(si−1, 11) := (si−1 + 2) mod (2k + 1) .
The i-th input symbol is xiyi. The modulo operation is, in fact, irrelevant, as an overflow is not
possible; hence, tun could be chosen arbitrarily on state/input pairs for which an overflow would
occur. An example for k = 3 is given in Figure 4.
Observation 5.4. After processing the sequence (x1y1)(x2y2) . . . (xkyk) for inputs x, y ∈ ξk([k+1]),
Mun is in state sk = ξ
−1
k (x) + ξ
−1
k (y).
Generalization to Stable Non-Codewords. We defined the mappings u and u to map non-
codewords to codewords. We adapt the state machine Mun to implicitly map the inputs in the
same sense such that we are able to add arbitrary bit strings that are not codewords as follows.
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Consider a single input string z ∈ Bk and suppose first that z1+⌊k/2⌋ is known a priori. If
z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 0, we interpret any input symbol as 0 once the first 0 occurred. This results in behavior
identical to processing u(z, 0). If z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 1, we process the input in reverse order, interpreting
any input symbol as 1 once the first 1 occurs. As the above state machine counts the total number
of 1s, not their order, this results in identical output to processing u(z, 1).
To enable equivalent behavior for arbitrary input strings, we reorder the input and (formally)
concatenate two state machines. The first state machine is initially presented with z1+⌊k/2⌋, which
it stores. Subsequently, it is fed the string z1 . . . z⌊k/2⌋. If z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 0, it counts the 1s until the
first 0 as above. If z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 1, it simply ignores the input. The second state machine receives
input string zkzk−1 . . . z2+⌊k/2⌋. It is initialized to the state of the previous one if z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 0; in
this case it will ignore its input. Otherwise it is initialized to state (1, k), meaning that z1+⌊k/2⌋ = 1,
and performs down-counts until it observes the first input of 1.
Observation 5.5. Given z ∈ Bk, processing z as described above results in the final state of the
second state machine to be (z1+⌊k/2⌋, ξ
−1
k (u(z, z1+⌊k/2⌋)).
Based on this insight, it is straightforward to compute ξ−1k (u(x, x1+⌊k/2⌋)) + ξ
−1
k (u(y, y1+⌊k/2⌋))
for inputs x, y ∈ Bk: processing the input in the right order and memorizing x1+⌊k/2⌋ and y1+⌊k/2⌋,
we can perform up- and down-counts in the same manner to compute the correct output.
Corollary 5.6. There is a state machine with O(k) states that computes ξ−1k (u(x, x1+⌊k/2⌋)) +
ξ−1k (u(y, y1+⌊k/2⌋)) for x, y ∈ B
n when fed the input sequence
(x1+⌊k/2⌋y1+⌊k/2⌋)(x1y1)(x2y2) . . . (x⌊k/2⌋y⌊k/2⌋)(xkyk)(xk−1yk−1) . . . (x2+⌊k/2⌋y2+⌊k/2⌋) .
Generalization to Arbitrary Input Parities. The addition above yields only the “right”
output if the parities of the leading binary reflected Gray code strings of inputs x = γn,k(i) and
y = γn,k(j) have both parity 0, as for parity 1 the unary part is encoded using ξ¯k. Fortunately, all
that is necessary to adapt the addition for other input parities is to take the complement of the
inputs’ unary parts in case the respective parity is 1. As we have that u¯(z, z1+⌊k/2⌋) = u(z¯, z¯1+⌊k/2⌋)
and ξ¯k(i) = ξk(i) for all i ∈ [k + 1], we get that
ξ¯−1k (u¯(z, z1+⌊k/2⌋)) = ξ¯
−1
k (u(z¯, z¯1+⌊k/2⌋)) = ξ
−1
k (u(z¯, z¯1+⌊k/2⌋)) .
Hence, to determine the sum correctly, it is sufficient to first run the parity machine Mpar on the
(n− k)-bit prefixes, then store the parities, and finally apply the state machine from Corollary 5.6,
where we apply the xor with the respective parity to each input symbol before processing it.
Corollary 5.7. Given inputs x = γn,k(i) and y = γn,k(j), there is a finite state machine Mξ with
O(k) states that determines πx := par(x1 . . . xn−k), πy := par(y1 . . . yn−k), and
sk(x, y) :=


ξ−1k (u(x)) + ξ
−1
k (u(y)) if πx = πy = 0
ξ−1k (u(x)) + ξ¯
−1
k (u¯(y)) if πx = 0 ∧ πy = 1
ξ¯−1k (u¯(x)) + ξ
−1
k (u(y)) if πx = 1 ∧ πy = 0
ξ¯−1k (u¯(x)) + ξ¯
−1
k (u¯(y)) if πx = πy = 1 .
Note that πx and πy are the parities of the binary reflected Gray code parts and sk is the correct
sum of the unary parts of x and y. The state sk also shows whether the sum is at most k or larger,
telling whether we have a carry that increases the sum of the (n− k)-bit prefixes by 1.
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Figure 5: Visualization of the state space Srg and the transition function trg of Trg. The starting
state is determined by Mξ, as either (0, 0, 0) (sum ≤ k) or (0, 0, 1) (sum > k).
5.1.3 Adding Reflected Gray Code
The following key observation permits a transducer performing the addition with a constant number
of states.
Lemma 5.8. Consider i, j ∈ [2n] and c ∈ B. Set x := rgn(i) and y := rgn(j). Denote by x
′ and y′
the (n− 1)-bit prefixes rgn(i)1,n−1 and rgn(j)1,n−1, respectively. Then
rgn(i+ j + c)1,n−1 = rgn−1(rg
−1
n−1(x
′) + rg−1n−1(y
′) + b) ,
where
b :=
{
1 if par(x) + par(y) + c ≥ 2
0 else.
Moreover,
rgn(i+ j + c)n = xn ⊕ yn ⊕ b⊕ c .
Proof. By Lemma 4.8, rg−1n (x) = 2 rg
−1
n−1(x
′) + par(x) (and likewise for y). Therefore,
i+ j + c = rg−1n (x) + rg
−1
n (y) + c = 2(rg
−1
n−1(x
′) + rg−1n−1(y
′)) + par(x) + par(y) + c .
As ⌊(i + j + c)/2⌋ = rg−1n−1(x
′) + rg−1n−1(y
′) + b, the first claim holds by Lemma 4.7. Moreover,
i+ j + c mod 2 = par(x)⊕ par(y)⊕ c, yielding that
rgn(i+ j + c)n = (par(x
′)⊕ par(y′)⊕ b)⊕ (par(x)⊕ par(y)⊕ c) = xn ⊕ yn ⊕ b⊕ c ,
as par(z1,n−1)⊕ par(z1,n) = zn for all z ∈ B
n.
As we can determine the parity using a constant-sized finite state machine, we can use Corol-
lary 3.15 to obtain a small circuit for the addition of the front part of our hybrid code.
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Lemma 5.9. There is a hazard-free circuit of size 2O(k)n and depth O(k log n) that computes
(x+γn,k y)1,n−k from inputs x, y ∈ γn,k([(k + 1)2
n]).
Proof. First we apply Lemma 5.8 inductively to obtain the transducer Trg, which is adding two
reflected Gray code strings. A picture of the transducer is given in Figure 5. The state ma-
chine is processing x1 . . . xn−k and y1 . . . yn−k from back to front. At step, i ∈ [1, n − k], it out-
puts (x +γn,k y)n−k+1−i = xn−k+1−i ⊕ yn−k+1−i ⊕ ci ⊕ ci−1. Here ci := 1 iff par(x1,n−k+1−i) +
par(y1,n−k+1−i) + ci−1 ≥ 2 and ci = 0 otherwise, where we assume that the initial state
12 to be
s0 = (par(x1,n−k),par(y1,n−k, c0) for c0 ∈ B. Thus, for i ∈ [k], state
si+1 = trg(si, xn−k−iyn−k−i) := (par(x1,n−k−i),par(y1,n−k−i), ci+1)
can be readily obtained from state si and the (i + 1)-th input symbol xn−k−iyn−k−i. The output
function is given by
org(si, xi+1yi+1) = x1,n−k−i ⊕ y1,n−k−i ⊕ ci+1 ⊕ ci .
The above defines, up to the choice of s0 ∈ B
3, a Moore machine Trg = (B
3, ·,B2,B, trg, org).
Inductive application of Lemma 5.8 shows that Trg with the specified inputs and starting state
produces output rgn−k(rg
−1
n−k(x1,n−k) + rg
−1
n−k(y1,n−k) + c0) (in reverse order). Using Mξ from
Corollary 5.7 to determine par(x1,n−k), par(y1,n−k), and sk(x, y), we can set c0 := 1 iff sk > k and
c0 := 0 to determine s0. Noting that
(x+γn,k y)1,n−k =
{
rgn−k(rg
−1
n−k(x1,n−k) + rg
−1
n−k(y1,n−k)) if sk(x, y) ≤ k
rgn−k(rg
−1
n−k(x1,n−k) + rg
−1
n−k(y1,n−k) + 1) if sk(x, y) > k ,
combining Mξ and T using Corollary 3.15 yields the desired circuit. Here, the size and depth
bounds follow from the fact that Mξ has O(k) states and the transducer has a constant number of
states.
5.1.4 Transducer Outputting the Unary Part
It remains to output the correct trailing k bits, which are encoded in unary depending on the parity
of the front string. Clearly, in parallel to outputting the leading n − k bits of the output, we can
determine its parity. Thus, based on the already determined value sk(x, y), it is straightforward to
write the trailing k bits of the output.
Corollary 5.10. There is a hazard-free circuit of size 2O(k)n and depth O(k log n) that computes
(x+γn,k y)n−k+1 . . . (x+γn,k y)n from inputs x, y ∈ γn,k([(k + 1)2
n]).
Proof. Knowing sk(x, y) and the parity of the (n−k)-bit prefix of the output, we output ξk(sk(x, y)
or ξ¯k(sk(x, y)), respectively, using a total of O(k) states.
The following theorem is now an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.9 and Corollary 5.10.
Theorem 5.11. There is a circuit of size 2O(k)n and depth O(k log n) that implements ⌈k/2⌉-
recoverable addition on γn,k.
12We will ensure the “correct” initial state by using Corollary 3.15 with the state machine from Corollary 5.7.
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5.2 Reducing the Dependency on k
We now reduce the maximum size of the state machines involved in the construction to O(1),
resulting in a circuit for k-recoverable addition of size O(n+ k log k) and depth O(log n). Roughly
speaking, we can execute the addition of the unary part by sorting, as described in the introduction,
and afterwards use a simple circuit to generate the correctly encoded result. However, the latter step
requires to determine the parity of the reflected Gray code part of the output string, which implies
that it has to be determined first—and computing this part of the output requires knowledge on
the carry bit from the unary addition.
This may look like a chicken-and-egg problem, but we can break this cyclic dependence as
follows. We first determine only the carry bit of the addition of the unary parts. As we will see,
for stable inputs (including non-codewords) this can be done by a constant-sized state machine.
Then we use the carry bit to perform the addition of the reflected Gray code parts as above, and
to obtain the parity of the reflected Gray code part of the output.
Knowing the various parity bits, we know the encoding function of the inputs’ unary parts as
well as the output’s unary part. We then use a construction based on a hazard-free multiplexer
to eliminate hazards involving the bits that determine how the input is encoded, i.e., the inputs’
parities and the bits on position n− k+2+ ⌊k/2⌋. This simplifies the task to devising hazard-free
circuits under the assumption that the respective bits are already known.
The final ingredient is to exploit that, by Observation 5.2, we may choose a different extension
of γ−1n,k to B
n to define how our circuits behave on non-codewords, so long as the resolutions of an
extended codeword (of small imprecision) are mapped to its range. We leverage this freedom by
choosing an extension γ˜−1n,k of γ
−1
n,k that (after branching according to parity and the bit on position
n − k + 2 + ⌊k/2⌋) essentially counts 1s or 0s. This enables usage of sorting as a suitable tool to
obtain codewords from non-codewords, resulting in very small hazard-free circuits. Interestingly, it
does not seem to be the case that γ˜−1n,k permits a small state machine deciding whether the unary
addition results in an overflow, thus necessitating the simultaneous use of both γ−1n,k and γ˜
−1
n,k to
obtain Theorem 5.20.
To formalize the above reasoning, we fix some notation. Denote the inputs by x(1), x(2) ∈ Bn, set
Σ := B2, and define x ∈ Σn via xi := x
(1)
i x
(2)
i . Moreover, throughout the remainder of this section,
we write x = yz, where y := x1 . . . xn−k and z := xn−k+1 . . . xn; analogously, write x
(1) = y(1)z(1)
and x(2) = y(2)z(2). Our goal is to compute x(1) +γn,k x
(2) according to Definition 5.1. We define
the following functions.
1. p(1) := par(y(1)) and p(2) := par(y(2)).
2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we will replace z(i) by f(x(i)) such that y(i)f(x(i)) = γn,k(γ
−1
n,k(x
(i))), i.e., we
“correct” x(i) to its associated codeword. Thus,
f(x(i)) :=
{
u(z(i), z
(i)
1+⌊k/2⌋) if par(y
(i)) = 0
u¯(z(i), z
(i)
1+⌊k/2⌋) if par(y
(i)) = 1 ,
where u and u¯ are as in Definition 4.14.
3. By c(x) := c(p(1), f(x(1)), p(2), f(x(2))) we denote the carry bit of the unary addition part, i.e.,
c(p(1), z(1), p(2), z(2)) :=


1 if p(1) = p(2) = 0 and ξ−1k (z
(1)) + ξ−1k (z
(2)) > k
1 if p(1) = 1 6= p(2) and ξ¯−1k (z
(1)) + ξ−1k (z
(2)) > k
1 if p(1) = 0 6= p(2) and ξ−1k (z
(1)) + ξ¯−1k (z
(2)) > k
1 if p(1) = p(2) = 1 and ξ¯−1k (z
(1)) + ξ¯−1k (z
(2)) > k
0 else.
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5.2.1 Computing the Carry Bit
We now show that a state machine of constant size is sufficient to compute c(x) for any input x,
where we slightly modify the input by providing the unary part simultaneously in reverse. Moreover,
we duplicate xn−k+1+⌊k/2⌋ and feed it to the state machine before the unary part of the input. That
is, x′ is defined via
x′i :=


xi if 1 ≤ i ≤ n− k
xn−k+1+⌊k/2⌋0 if i = n− k + 1
xi−1x2n−k−i+2 if n− k + 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 ,
where the trailing 0 on index n − k + 1 serves as a marker to distinguish this index for the state
machine, which has insufficient memory to store the current index.
Lemma 5.12. There is a state machine of size O(1) that, given x′ as input, computes c(x).
Proof. Our state machine first determines p(1) and p(2), which is trivial using two state bits, cf. Ob-
servation 5.3; these values then are stored without modification while processing the remaining
input symbols.
Consider ζ
(1)
i := x
(1)
n−k+1+i ⊕ p
(1) and ζ
(2)
i := x
(2)
n−k+1+i ⊕ p
(2) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Note that
reinterpreting input symbols like this can be done on the fly, as p(1) and p(2) are known. This
interpretation “translates” for all i ∈ [k + 1] from ξ¯k(i) to ξk(i) if the parity is 1 and leaves the
string unmodified otherwise. Moreover, we have that u(w,w1+⌊k/2⌋) = u(w¯, w¯1+⌊k/2⌋) for all w ∈ B
k.
Therefore, reinterpreting the input symbol x′n−k+1+⌊k/2⌋ (minus the trailing 0) in the same manner
using the parities, w.l.o.g. it suffices to consider the case that p(1) = p(2) = 0 and then apply the
resulting machine to inputs ζ
(1)
i and ζ
(2)
i .
Under this assumption, we need to distinguish four cases, depending on b1 := z
(1)
1+⌊k/2⌋
and
b2 := z
(2)
1+⌊k/2⌋. These values are fed to the machine on index n − k + 1, marked by a trailing 0
indicating the transition from y to z. Recall that u(w, 1) is the codeword of ξk sharing the longest
suffix with w ∈ Bk, while u(w, 0) is the codeword sharing the longest prefix. Observe that always
u(w,w1+⌊k/2⌋)1+⌊k/2⌋ = w1+⌊k/2⌋. Therefore, w1+⌊k/2⌋ = 1 implies that ξ
−1
k (u(w,w1+⌊k/2⌋)) ≥
1 + ⌊k/2⌋ and w1+⌊k/2⌋ = 0 implies that ξ
−1
k (u(w,w1+⌊k/2⌋)) < 1 + ⌊k/2⌋. We conclude that (i)
b1 = b2 = 1 entails that
ξ−1k (u(z
(1), b1)) + ξ
−1
k (u(z
(2), b2)) ≥ 2
(
1 +
⌊
k
2
⌋)
> k
and, similarly, (ii) b1 = b2 = 0 entails that ξ
−1
k (u(z
(1), b1)) + ξ
−1
k (u(z
(2), b2)) ≤ 2⌊k/2⌋ ≤ k.
Next, consider the case that b1 = 1 6= b2 = 0. Denote by i1 ∈ {1, . . . , k} the largest index
such that z
(1)
i1
= 1 and by i2 ∈ {1, . . . , k} the smallest index such that z
(2)
i2+1
= 0. Accordingly,
ξ−1k (u(z
(1), b1)) = i1 and ξ
−1
k (u(z
(2), b2)) = i2. We need to check whether i1 + i2 > k or not. To
this end, examine z(1) index by index in reverse order, while simultaneously doing the same for z(2)
front to back. The above condition is satisfied if and only if we encounter the first 0 in z(2) (which
happens in step i2 + 1) at least two steps after the first 1 when traversing z
(1) in reverse (which
occurs in step k − i1). Clearly, this can be tested by a state machine of constant size receiving x
′
as input.
Finally, there is the case that b1 = 0 6= b2 = 1; this case is analogous to the previous one, with
the roles of z(1) and z(2) exchanged. As the input symbol at index n− k+1 enables distinguishing
the above four cases, it is straightforward to design a state machine of constant size computing c(x)
given input x′.
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As we already established that we can compute the reflected Gray code part of the output using
a constant-sized transducer given c(x) as input, we obtain as a corollary that the (n− k)-bit prefix
of the output can be computed by a small circuit.
Corollary 5.13. There is a hazard-free circuit of size O(n) and depth O(log n) that computes
(x+γ y)1,n−k from inputs x, y ∈ γn,k([(k + 1)2
n]).
Proof. We apply Corollary 3.15 together with Lemmas 5.8 and 5.12.
5.2.2 Computing the Sum of the Unary Parts
We first make an observation that simplifies our task, namely that even in face of unstable inputs,
it is valid to “compress” the front part of the inputs to their parity when seeking to determining
the trailing k bits of the output.
Observation 5.14. For all x(1), x(2) ∈ Tn and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have that(
x(1)(+γn,k)ux
(2)
)
n−k+i
=
(
par
u
(y(1))z(1)(+γk+1,k)u paru(y
(2))z(2)
)
i+1
.
Proof. We have that res(par
u
(w)) = par(res(w)) for any w ∈ Tn−k. Moreover, par(u +rgn−k w) =
par(u) + par(w) for all u,w ∈ Tn−k. Using these identities and the definition of γn,k, we get that(
par
u
(y(1))z(1)(+γk+1,k)u paru(y
(2))w(2)
)
1+i
= ∗
(
par(res(y(1))) res(z(1)) +γk+1,k par(res(y
(2))) res(z(2))
)
1+i
= ∗
(
res(y(1)) res(z(1)) +γn,k res(y
(2)) res(z(2))
)
n−k+i
=
(
x(1)(+γn,k)ux
(2)
)
n−k+i
.
Hence, we may first compute par
u
(y(1)) and par
u
(y(2)) using a simple xor tree, reducing the
task to the special case that n = k+1. Together with Corollary 5.13 and the fact that hazard-free
circuits of exponential size always exist, this already yields a circuit of size O(2O(k)+n) and depth
O(k + log n). However, we will reduce the dependency on k further. Due to Observation 5.14, we
may assume w.l.o.g. that n = k+1 in the following, as the additive O(n) cost in size and O(log n)
depth do not affect the asymptotic bounds we obtain.
Our next step simplifies the task further. Given inputs x, y ∈ Tn, we use a variant of “speculative
computing” [TY12, TYM14]. The idea is to replace bits in fixed positions by stable inputs and,
for each such combination, to evaluate the function. In [TY12, TYM14], the authors wait for the
respective inputs to stabilize and only then complete the function evaluation by using the stabilized
bits as control string in a multiplexer to choose the correct pre-computed value. By replacing the
multiplexer with a hazard-free multiplexer, we obtain a circuit that is protected against hazards
caused by unstable inputs at the respective positions [IKL+18].
Lemma 5.15. Let f : Bn1 × Bn2 → Bm. For s ∈ Bn1, let Cs be a hazard-free circuit of depth ds
implementing f(s, ·). Then there is a hazard-free circuit of size O(m2n1) +
∑
s∈Bn1 |Cs| and depth
O(n1) + maxs∈Bn1{ds} implementing f .
Proof. W.l.o.g., suppose m = 1; for larger m, simply perform the construction for each output
bit, increasing the size of the multiplexer by factor m. Let (y, z) ∈ Tn1 × Tn2 . We use a hazard-
free multiplexer with n1 control bits whose select string is y and whose selectable input labeled by
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s ∈ Bn1 receives input fu(s, z). The size of the multiplexer is O(2
n1) and its depth is O(n1) [IKL
+18,
Lemma 5.1]. To compute fu(s, z), we use Cs. The size and depth bounds are immediate.
For correctness, observe that ∗ res(∗S) = ∗S for any set S (which the ∗ operator accepts).
Hence,
fu(x) = ∗
s∈res(y)
z′∈res(z)
f(s, z′)
= ∗
s∈res(y)
res
(
∗
z′∈res(z)
f(s, z′)
)
= ∗
s∈res(y)
res(f(s, ·)u(z))
= MUXu(y, (f(s, ·)u(z))s∈Bn1 ) .
Note that we can re-index the input as needed, i.e., for any given Boolean function, the above
lemma can be applied to an arbitrary subset of input indices.
We intend to apply Lemma 5.15 to the parities and the “center” bits of the unary strings, i.e.,
to x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2+⌊k/2⌋, and x
(2)
2+⌊k/2⌋. Accordingly, we need to devise for each stable assignment to
these four values a circuit computing the hazard-free extension of the output function, where the
inputs x ∈ Tn satisfy the constraint that x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(1)
2+⌊k/2⌋, and x
(2)
2+⌊k/2⌋ are known stable values.
To this end, we will make use of hazard-free sorting circuits. However, sorting the unary part
of a non-codeword leads to different results in terms of mapping non-codewords to codewords than
γ−1k+1,k would yield. Accordingly, we first need to specify a different extension of γ
−1
k+1,k to non-
codewords that is consistent with the requirements of k-recoverability, i.e., Definition 4.1. For this
modified extension, we can implement (+γk+1,k)u using sorting, and Observation 5.2 shows that,
on extended codewords of sufficiently small imprecision, the result is identical to using the original
extension of γ−1k+1,k.
Definition 5.16. We define γ˜−1k+1,k : B
k+1 → [2(k + 1)] as follows.
γ˜−1k+1,k(v) =


|{i ∈ {2, . . . , 1 + ⌊k/2⌋} | vi = 1}| if v1 = v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 0
1 + ⌊k/2⌋ + |{i ∈ {3 + ⌊k/2⌋, . . . , k + 1 | vi = 1}| if v1 = 0 ∧ v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 1
k + 1 + |{i ∈ {2, . . . , 1 + ⌊k/2⌋} | v¯i = 1}| if v1 = v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 1
k + 2 + ⌊k/2⌋ + |{i ∈ {3 + ⌊k/2⌋, . . . , k + 1 | v¯i = 1}| if v1 = 1 ∧ v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 0 .
Lemma 5.17. Let w be an extended codeword of γk+1,k of imprecision at most ⌈k/2⌉. Then
γ˜−1k+1,k(res(w)) ⊆ rx.
Proof. Denote rw = {imin, . . . , imax}, where imin ∈ [2(k + 1)] and for notational convenience we
interpret all values modulo 2(k + 1) (recall that γk+1,k has domain [2(k + 1)]). Given v ∈ res(w),
we distinguish four cases.
• imax ≤ k. Then w = 01
iminuimax−imin0k−imax . If v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 0, then
γ˜−1k+1,k(v) ∈
{
imin, . . . ,min
{⌊
k
2
⌋
, imax
}}
.
If v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 1, then
γ˜−1k+1,k(v) ∈
{
max
{
imin, 1 +
⌊
k
2
⌋}
, . . . , imax
}
.
Either way, γ˜−1k+1,k(v) ∈ res(w).
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• imin ∈ {1 + ⌊k/2⌋, . . . , k} and imax > k. As w has imprecision at most ⌈k/2⌉, imax <
k + 2 + ⌊k/2⌋, and w = u uimax−(k+1)1k−(imax−imin−1)uk−imin satisfies that w2+⌊k/2⌋ = 1. If
v1 = 0, then γ˜
−1
k+1,k(v) ∈ {imin, . . . , k}. If v1 = 1, then γ˜
−1
k+1,k(v) ∈ {k + 1, . . . , imax}.
• imin ≥ k + 1 and imax < 2(k + 1). Then w = 10
imin−(k+1)uimax−imin02k+1−imax . As in the first
case, we get that γ˜−1k+1,k(v) ∈ rx, regardless of whether v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 0 or v2+⌊k/2⌋ = 1.
• k + 2 + ⌊k/2⌋ ≤ imin ≤ 2k + 1. As w has imprecision at most ⌈k/2⌉, imax < 2k + 1 + ⌊k/2⌋,
and w = u uimax−(2k+2)1k−(imax−imin−1)u2k+1−imin satisfies that w2+⌊k/2⌋ = 0. As in the second
case, we get that γ˜−1k+1,k(v) ∈ rx, regardless of whether v1 = 0 or v1 = 1.
It is easy to verify that the above case distinction is exhaustive, as imax − imin ≤ ⌈k/2⌉ due to w
having imprecision at most ⌈k/2⌉.
Equipped with γ˜−1k+1,k, we are in the position to apply sorting to perform the desired hazard-free
addition. For simplicity, we break this up into two steps, where we first produce a unary encoding
of the sum.
Lemma 5.18. There is a circuit of size O(k log k) and depth O(log k) that, given two extended
codewords x(1), x(2) ∈ Tk+1 of γk+1,k with total imprecision p := px(1) + px(2) ≤ ⌈k/2⌉, outputs the
imprecision-p extended unary codeword ∗i∈r
x(1)
+r
x(2)
ξ4k+2(i).
Proof. We first construct for each b ∈ B4 a hazard-free circuit computing the correct output pro-
vided that x
(1)
1 = b1, x
(1)
2+⌊k/2⌋ = b2, x
(2)
1 = b3, and x
(2)
2+⌊k/2⌋ = b4. Fix such a b ∈ B
4. We specify
inputs z1(x), . . . , z4k+2(x) to a sorting network for input universe B; note that the order of the
inputs is irrelevant. x(1) and x(2) each determine 2k + 1 input values in the same way, so w.l.o.g.
we explain how to do this for x(1) only. We distinguish four cases, depending on b1 and b2:
• b1 = b2 = 0. Then ⌊k/2⌋ inputs are given by x
(1)
2 , . . . , x
(1)
1+⌊k/2⌋, and the remaining 2k + 1 −
⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 0.
• b1 = 0 and b2 = 1. Then 1+⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 1, ⌊k/2⌋−1 inputs are given by x
(1)
3+⌊k/2⌋, . . . , x
(1)
k+1,
and the remaining 2k + 1− 2⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 0.
• b1 = b2 = 1. Then k + 1 inputs are fixed to 1, ⌊k/2⌋ inputs are given by x¯
(1)
2 , . . . , x¯
(1)
1+⌊k/2⌋,
and the remaining k − ⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 0.
• b1 = 1 and b2 = 0. Then k + 2 + ⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 1, ⌊k/2⌋ − 1 inputs are given by
x¯
(1)
3+⌊k/2⌋, . . . , x¯
(1)
k+1, and the remaining k − 2⌊k/2⌋ inputs are 0.
The construction is analogous for x(2), where b3 and b4 take the role of b1 and b2, respectively. We
can see from Definition 5.16 that the number of inputs that are 1 equals γ˜−1k+1,k(x
(1)) + γ˜−1k+1,k(x
(2))
by construction. Thus, sorting z(x) yields the correct output on stable values, granted that indeed
x
(1)
1 = b1, x
(1)
2+⌊k/2⌋ = b2, x
(2)
1 = b3, and x
(2)
2+⌊k/2⌋ = b4.
Next, we ensure that the circuit doing so is hazard-free. Observe that negation translates ξ¯n to
ξn (and back) for any n, and as double negation is the identity also in Kleene logic, this translation
is hazard-free. Therefore, we can safely negate inputs as stated above and then perform the sorting;
the resulting circuit has a hazard if and only if the sorting part has one. However, we can perform
the sorting operation using comparators consisting of an or gate and an and gate each, resulting in a
sorting network without any negation gates, i.e., a monotone circuit, which is hazard-free [IKL+18,
Lemma 4.2]. Using an asymptotically optimal sorting network, the circuit has size O(k log k) and
depth O(log k) [AKS83].
To complete the proof, we apply Lemma 5.15 (after suitable re-indexation) to the bits x
(1)
1 ,
x
(1)
2+⌊k/2⌋, x
(2)
1 , and x
(2)
2+⌊k/2⌋. Thus, n1 = 4 and n2,m ∈ O(k) in the application of the lemma,
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and the resulting circuit satisfies the claimed bounds on size and depth. As it is hazard-free, it
computes
∗
y(1)∈res(x(1))
y(2)∈res(x(2))
ξ4k+2(γ˜
−1
k+1,k(y
(1)) + γ˜−1k+1,k(y
(2))) = ∗
i∈γ˜−1
k+1,k(res(x
(1)))
j∈γ˜−1
k+1,k(res(x
(2)))
ξ4k+2(i+ j) = ∗
i∈r
x(1)
+r
x(2)
ξ4k+2(i) .
on inputs of imprecision at most ⌈k/2⌉, where in the last step we used that γ˜−1k+1,k(res(x
(1))) = rx(1)
and γ˜−1k+1,k(res(x
(2))) = rx(2) by Lemma 5.17.
As our final step, we need to translate the obtained unary encoding to the encoding given by
γk+1,k. This is straightforward, because each input bit affects a single output bit only, by flipping
it on the up-count it corresponds to. This permits a simple implementation based on xor trees,
cf. [FKLP17, Lemma 3.5].
Lemma 5.19. There is a hazard-free circuit of size O(n + k log k) and depth O(log n) that, given
x, y ∈ Bn, computes (x+γn,k y)n−k+1,n.
Proof. By Observation 5.14, we may w.l.o.g. assume that n = k + 1 (adding O(n) and O(log n) to
the size and depth of the circuit, respectively). By Lemma 5.18, we can obtain ∗i∈rx+ry ξ4k+2(i)
by a circuit of size O(k log k) and depth O(log k).
Next, note that γk+1,k(0) = 0
k+1 and for i ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1}, the bit at index i is “toggled”
on up-counts j(k + 1) + i, where j ∈ [4]. Thus, γk+1,k(a)i =
⊕
j∈[4] ξ4k+2(a)j(k+1)+i for all such
i and a ∈ [4k + 2]. Because the parity (i.e., xor) always depends on each unspecified input
bit, even when fixing all other ones, this equality extends to Kleene logic. Therefore, adding
O(k) xor gates and increasing the depth by O(1), we arrive at the desired circuit computing
(x+γn,k y)n−k+1 . . . (x+γn,k y)n.
Together with Corollary 5.13, we arrive at a circuit that is trivially asymptotically optimal in
depth and for all k ∈ O(n/ log n) also in size.
Theorem 5.20. There is a circuit of size O(n + k log k) and depth O(log n) that implements
⌈k/2⌉-recoverable addition on γn,k.
Proof. Follows immediately from Corollary 5.13 and Lemma 5.19.
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